

ZONE DESC. LETTER

41

TIME PREVIOUS DAY: []

EST: []

EDT: []

TIME NEXT DAY: []

Zone	M	L	K	J	I	H	G	F	E	D	C	B	A	Z	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y
AUSTRALIA	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	09	08	07	06	05	04	03	02	01	00	23	22	21	20	19	18	17	
TOYKO SEOUL KOREA	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	09	08	07	06	05	04	03	02	01	00	23	22	21	20	19	18	
MANILA CHINA VIETNAM HONG KONG	19	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	09	08	07	06	05	04	03	02	01	00	23	22	21	20	19	
THAILAND LAOS BANGKOK	20	19	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	09	08	07	06	05	04	03	02	01	00	23	22	21	20	
MOSCOW MAGNAD MOMBASA	21	20	19	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	09	08	07	06	05	04	03	02	01	00	23	22	21	
PARIS BERLIN ROME TANGIER LONDON LISBON	22	21	20	19	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	09	08	07	06	05	04	03	02	01	00	23	22	
SO. AMER.	23	22	21	20	19	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	09	08	07	06	05	04	03	02	01	00	23	
WASH PANAMA	00	23	22	21	20	19	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	09	08	07	06	05	04	03	02	01	00	
CENT AM LESS PANAMA	01	00	23	22	21	20	19	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	09	08	07	06	05	04	03	02	01	
HAWAII	02	01	00	23	22	21	20	19	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	09	08	07	06	05	04	03	02	

GEN WHEELER: I see. I understand.
ADM SHARP: You know?
GEN WHEELER: Yes, I see.
ADM SHARP: And we've got some opposition to bother about.
GEN WHEELER: Right.
ADM SHARP: So I'd like to concentrate on it a little bit.
GEN WHEELER: I got the picture now.
ADM SHARP: Good.
GEN WHEELER: OK, Ollie.
ADM SHARP: Right O.
GEN WHEELER: I'll call you a little later.
ADM SHARP: Right O.
GEN WHEELER: Bye.
ADM SHARP: Bye.

LIST OF UNITS ALERTED AND/OR MOVED AS A
RESULT OF 4 AUGUST JCS-SECDEF MEETING

A. FORCES TO DEPLOY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

<u>ORDERED</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>UNIT/COMPOSITION</u>
1 CVS Group	Japan	So China Sea	TG 70.2 1 CVS (USS KEARSARGE) 4 DD 3 DE
Special Landing Force (Marines)	Subic Bay	Vicinity Da Nang	TG 76.5 1600 men 24 UH-34 Helicopters 1 LPH (USS VALLEY FORGE) 1 APA 1 LSD
Marine	Okinawa	So China Sea	9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade 6500 men 1 AGC 2 APA 1 AKA 2 LSD 8 LST
Recce Task Force	STRICOM	Kadena	6 RF-101 (20th TRS Shaw AFB, SC)
CVA TG	1st Flt.	WESTPAC	TG 77.4 Carrier Strike Group 1 CVA (USS RANGER) 4 DD

B. FORCES ALERTED FOR DEPLOYMENT IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT OF POLITICAL CLEARANCE

<u>ORDERED</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>UNIT(S)</u>
2 B-57 Sqdns	Clark	SVN	8th Tactical Bombing Sqdn. 13 th Tactical Bombing Sqdn.
1 F-105 Sqdn	Yokota	Korat	80th Tactical Fighter Sqdn.
1 F-100 Sqdn	Clark	Takhli	615th Tactical Fighter Sqdn.
1 FIS Sqdn (12 F-102)	Clark	SVN	509th Fighter Interceptor Sqdn.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD/ISA 3/3/77
By mmg 4/21/77

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

<u>ORDERED</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>UNIT(S)</u>
8 KC-135	SAC	Clark	8 KC-135 Tankers from CONUS
2 F-100 Sqn	STRICOM	Clark	514th Tactical Fighter Sqn. (Cannon AFB, N.M.) 622D Tactical Fighter Sqn. (England AFB, La.)
1 F-105 Sqn	STRICOM	Yokota	357th Tactical Fighter Sqn. (McConnell AFB, Kans)
1 Recce Task Force (6 RF-101)	Misawa/ Kadena	Southeast Asia	15th Tactical Reconnaissance Sqn. 45th Tactical Reconnaissance Sqn.

C. FORCES ALERTED FOR POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT

<u>ORDERED</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>UNIT(S)</u>
173rd Airborne Brigade	Okinawa	Southeast Asia	173rd Abn Bde (Army) 3530 men
Forward Floating Depot	Philippines	Thailand	3 ships with equipment for 1 Arty Bn, 2 Inf Bn, 1 Mech Co.
Marine Air Group	Okinawa	Da Nang	Marine Air Group 12 (Composite) 2000 men 24 A4C 17 RF-8 6 OH-43
1 Army Brigade	Hawaii	Thailand	Bde 25th Inf Div 3600 men

~~TOP SECRET~~

3. Question: Where was USS TICONDEROGA at the time USS MADDOX established new radar contact with two unidentified surface vessels and three unidentified aircraft (Event 2)?

Answer: Approximately 100 nautical miles ENE of Da Nang

4. Question: When did USS CONSTELLATION leave Hong Kong? Who ordered it to move and to where was it sent?

5:19 AM EDT, AUGUST 2ND

AUG. 2ND 7:25 PM

Answer: At 020919Z COMSEVENTHFLT directed CTG 77.6 to make all preparations to get underway but to take no action which would cause public speculation. At 030125Z CTG 77.6 submitted a movement report for TG 77.6 to depart Hong Kong 040001Z. At 041448Z CINCPACFLT ordered TG 77.6 to join TG 77.5 as soon as possible.

AUG 2

AUG 3 6 01 PM

5. Question: When were the Rules of Engagement issued to the destroyers on the DESOTA Patrol? What were the Rules of Engagement?

Answer: They were issued by JCS 7700 DTG 041433Z which was released by SECDEF at 041420Z.

The Rules of Engagement were:

10:48 AM 470

".... a. Move the CONSTELLATION into the area of South Vietnam, exact location at your discretion.

b. Closest approach to the North Vietnam coastline for the DESOTA Patrol will be 11 nautical miles.

c. In the event of hostile attack against our forces, aircraft only are authorized to pursue and attack the hostile forces up to the 3 nautical mile limit of the North Vietnamese coastline...."

Resume of Personnel Present During Secretary of Defense Portions of Special JCS/SEC DEF/SEC STATE Meeting on Tuesday, 4 August 1964 at 1125 in Secretary of Defense Conference Room

	<u>IN</u>	<u>OUT</u>	<u>IN</u>	<u>OUT</u>	<u>OUT</u>
1. Mr. McNamara (Sec Def)	1120	1204			
2. Mr. Vance (Dep Sec Def)	1120	1204	1220	1225	
3. GEN LeMay, USAF (CSAF)	1120				1349
4. ADM McDonald, USN (CNO)	1120				1349
5. GEN Greene, USMC (CMC)	1120				1349
6. GEN Johnson, USA (CSA)	1120				1349
7. LGEN Goodpaster, USA (OCJCS)	1120				1349
8. LGEN Burchinal, USAF (D/JS)	1120	in & out frequently			1349
9. COL Bottomly, USAF (Asst Secy JCS)	1120				1349
10. RADM Mustin, USN (J-3)	1120				1349
11. BGEN Reaves, USA (J-3)	1120				1349
12. Mr. Rusk (Secretary of State)	1138	1204			
13. Mr. Green (Dep Asst Sec State, Far East Affairs)	1138	1204			
14. Mr. McGeorge Bundy (Spec Asst to President, NSA)	1140	1204			

25 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LEVINSON

Subject: Bay of Tonkin Attack, 4-5 August 1964

1. Question: Why were alert preparations for PIERCE ARROW strike so late in being taken on board TICONDEROGA?

Answer: Task Group 77.5 was already on alert status as result of PT boat attacks on DESOTA destroyers.

Detailed planning for the specific targets could not be initiated until the CINCPACFLT preparatory order was received.

It is noted that the time of receipt (042055Z) of CINCPACFLT message 042014Z (Preparatory order) followed by only six minutes the JCS strike execute message to CINCPAC which was transmitted by direct teletype from NMCC to CINCPAC Command Center at 042049Z.

2. Question: Why was CONSTELLATION told not to execute the strike until directed to do so?

Answer: Telephone conversations between Admiral Sharp and General Burchinal at 042040Z, 042123Z, 042139Z indicate the strike would not be launched until the second attack on MADDOX was confirmed.

A telephone conversation between Admiral Sharp and General Burchinal at 042207Z indicates SECDEF is satisfied that MADDOX attack is valid and the strike has been ordered. In this same conversation Admiral Sharp said, "OK, I'm going to tell CINCPACFLT to go."

1655

2055

2207
4
1807

3. Question: When was first word of the second attack on MADDOX received in Pentagon? When and by what means were Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler notified of this attack?

Answer: Official logs of DIA Indications Center reveal the following:

First word of 2nd MADDOX incident received by DIA Indications Center at 0814 EDT (1214Z) in form of telephone call from NSA. While NSA still on phone, a copy of NSA field unit message arrived in DIA Indications Center via SSO cable channels.

Xerox copies were given immediately to Col. Charles F. Gillis, Chief of Current Intelligence and Indications Center, DIA, who dispatched an officer courier immediately to disseminate same to following in order listed:

M/General Taylor, DIA
Chairman, JCS
Director, Joint Staff
Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
General Carroll, DIA
ISA

The DIA courier advises that the entire run of the above offices requires approximately 15 minutes. Allowing for Xerox reproduction time, it is estimated that copies of the alerting message were delivered to the Chairman and Secretary sometime between 0830 and 0900 EDT 4 Aug 64.

Ralph G. Spencer
RALPH G. SPENCER
Lt Commander, USN
Military Secretary

46a

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Chronology of Second Attack

(All times are local time at the destroyer's position.)

After the first attack on the USS MADDOX, on Sunday, the MADDOX joined with its sister destroyer, the USS TURNER JOY, on the Gulf of Tonkin and resumed its patrol in international waters, as directed by President Johnson. The patrol was uneventful during most of the daylight hours of Tuesday, August 4.

Late afternoon, August 4, the MADDOX reported radar contact with unidentified surface vessels who were paralleling its track and the track of the TURNER JOY.

1 7:40 A¹, August 4. The MADDOX reported that from actions being taken by the unidentified vessels, an attack by them appeared imminent. The MADDOX was heading southeast near the center of the Gulf of Tonkin in international waters approximately 65 miles from nearest land. CTG 72.1 msg 041240Z received 041348Z 0948 EDT

2 8:36 A¹, August 4. The MADDOX established new radar contact with two unidentified surface vessels and three unidentified aircraft. At this time, U. S. fighter aircraft were launched from the USS TICONDEROGA to rendezvous with the MADDOX and the TURNER JOY to provide protection against possible attack from the unidentified vessels and aircraft, in accordance with the President's previously issued directives.

3 9:08 A¹, August 4. The MADDOX reported that the unidentified aircraft had disappeared from its radar screen and that the surface vessels were remaining at a distance. The U.S. aircraft from the TICONDEROGA arrived and commenced defensive patrol over the MADDOX and the TURNER JOY. CTG 77.5 msg 041408Z received 041504Z 1104 EDT

4 9:30 A¹, August 4. Additional vessels were observed on the MADDOX radar, and these vessels began to close rapidly on the destroyer patrol at speeds in excess of 40 knots. The attacking craft continued to close rapidly from the west and south and the MADDOX reported that their intentions were evaluated as hostile. CTG 77.5 msg 041434Z received 041520Z 1120 EDT

5 9:52 A¹, August 4. The destroyers reported that they were under continuous torpedo attack and were engaged in defensive counterfire. CTG 72.1 msg 041442Z received 041539Z 1139 EDT CTG 72.1 msg 041452Z received 041542Z 1142 EDT

6 10:15 A¹, August 4. The destroyers reported that they had avoided torpedoes and had sunk one of the attacking craft. CTG 72.1 msg 041515Z received 041602Z. This same information was received by telephone at 041552Z. 1202 EDT 1152 EDT

(More)

7 10:42 AM, August 4. The destroyers reported that they had evaded additional torpedoes and had sunk another of the attacking craft. Other protective aircraft had arrived overhead, but weather and darkness were hampering their capabilities. CTG 72.1 msg 041542Z received 041637Z. Same info by phone 041622Z.

8 10:52 AM, August 4. The MADDOX reported ^{11:37 EDT} that the destroyers were again under ^{11:22 EDT} attack. NAVCOMSTA PHIL msg 041550Z received 041824Z

12:00 NOON
Midnight. The patrol reported that, even though torpedoes had been fired at them, they had suffered no hits nor casualties and that the defensive aircraft from the TICONDEROGA were illuminating the area and attacking the enemy surface craft. CTG 77.5 msg 041600Z received 041746Z.

10 12:32 PM, August 5. The patrol reported that ^{13:46 EDT} at least two enemy craft had been sunk and that low ceilings continued to hamper the aircraft operations.

11 12:54 PM, August 5. The TURNER JOY reported that during the engagement, in addition to the torpedo attack, she was fired upon by automatic weapons while being illuminated by searchlights.

12 1:36 PM, August 5. The destroyers reported that the attacking craft had apparently broken off the engagement.

The MADDOX and TURNER JOY were directed to resume their patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin at daylight on the 5th of August.

END

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

INCOMING MESSAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

48

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)	PRECEDENCE (INFO)
IMMEDIATE	IMMEDIATE

O 161407Z

FM CINCPACFLT

TO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

INFO RUEKDA/JCS
RUMGZK/CTF 77
RUMFZL/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUECW/CNO

MISC

~~SECRET~~

PIERCE ARROW (U)

- A. JCS 142107Z
- B. CINCPAC 142319Z NOTAL
- C. CINCPAC 150902Z NOTAL

DECLASSIFIED
Authority OSD Ltr 2/19/97
By mg, NARS, Date 6/30/97

1. REF A, B AND C REQUESTED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING EXECUTION OF OPERATION PIERCE ARROW.

2. THE FOLLOWING GROUPS OF AIRCRAFT WERE USED AGAINST TARGETS AS INDICATED, READ IN 4 COLUMNS:

TARGET	GROUP	AIRCRAFT	LAUNCH TIME
VINH/BON THUY/	1	4A1	050243Z
PHUC LOI	2	6A4	050421Z
	3	6 F8	050416Z
	4	4 F8	050800Z
	5	8 A4	050800Z
QUANG KHE	6	6 F8	050434Z
HON ME	7	2 A4	050800Z
HON GAY	8	4 A1	050500Z
	9	10 A4	050630Z

INFO....NMCC-4 FILE-1 (5) SO

REFS B & C NOT HELD - WILL FURNISH ON REQUEST IF OBTAINABLE.

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INCOMING MESSAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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PRECEDENCE (ACTION)	PRECEDENCE (INFO)
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LOC CHAO 10 5 A4 050630Z
 11 4 A1 050500Z

3. ADDITIONAL INFO FOLLOWS IN QUESTION AND ANSWER FORM:

A. QUESTION - WHAT WAS LOCATION OF EACH GROUP AIRBORNE AT 050334Z?

ANSWER - GROUP ONE WAS ONLY STRIKE GROUP AIRBORNE. AT 050335Z IT TOOK DEPARTURE FROM TICONDEROGA AT POSIT 16-04N, 110-20E.

B. QUESTION - WHAT COURSE DID EACH GROUP FOLLOW FROM LAUNCH TO TARGET?

ANSWER - GROUPS 1-7 LAUNCHED FROM TICO IN VICINITY POINT YANKEE AND PROCEEDED DIRECT COURSE TO ASSIGNED TARGETS.

GROUP 1 ALT 8-1300 FT, SPD 190 KTS;
 GROUP 2-7 ALT 20-30M SPD 325-400 KTS
 GROUP 8/11 ROUTE: LAUNCH 17-07N, 110-59E
 DIRECT 18-00N, 108-00E DIRECT TARGETS, ALT 1-5000 FT,
 TAS 160 K.

GROUPS 9/10 ROUTE: LAUNCH 16-42N, 110-42E
 DIRECT 18-00N, 108-00E DIRECT TARGETS, ALT 24-30000 FT,
 TAS 420 K.

C. QUESTION - WHERE WERE CVA'S AT 10:36 (050236Z) AND WHAT COURSES DID THEY FOLLOW FROM THAT TIME THROUGH THE TIME OF LAST STRIKE?

ANSWERS -

(1) TICO STEAMDED VARIOUS COURSES VICINITY PT YANKEE (16N, 110E) DURING PIERCE ARROW OPS.

TIME	LATITUDE	LONGITUDE
0236Z	16-04	110-16
0400Z	16-16	110-21
0600Z	16-13	110-25
0800Z	16-13	110-26
1000Z	16-14	110-28

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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PRECEDENCE (ACTION)	PRECEDENCE (INFO)
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(2) FOR CONSTELLATION:
 TIME LATITUDE LONGITUDE
 0236Z 17-34 111-34
 0243Z 17-31 111-32
 (TG 77.5 FIRST LAUNCH)
 0500Z 17-07 110-59
 (TG 77.6 FIRST LAUNCH)
 0630Z 16-42 110-42
 (TG 77.6 LAST LAUNCH)

D. QUESTION - DID ANY OF THE A/C PARTICIPATING IN STRIKES FLY MORE THAN ONE SORTIE, AND IF SO, HOW MANY?

ANSWER - YES. FIRST STRIKE: 2 TICO F8, 2 A4, 1 KA4 RECOVERED FROM DESOTO RECCE MISSION 050000Z AND TURNED AROUND TO PARTICIPATE FIRST STRIKE. SECOND STRIKE: 4 TICO F8, 2 A4, 5 KA4 RECOVERED FROM FIRST STRIKE AND TURNED AROUND FOR RESTRIKE. ALL UP STRIKE A/C ON TICO WERE LAUNCHED ON FIRST STRIKE. TURN AROUND TIME FROM RECOVERY OF FIRST STRIKE TO LAUNCH OF RESTRIKE ACCOMPLISHED IN 59 MINUTES.

	Strike	Turned	Tot
DESOTO	4	1	5
P. Arrow	6	5	11
	10	6	
		16	

E. QUESTION - WHY WEREN'T ALL THE STRIKES SIMULTANEOUS?

ANSWER - FOR THE FIRST PIERCE ARROW STRIKE, IT WAS INITIALLY PLANNED TO CONDUCT A COORDINATED TICO/CONSTELLATION STRIKE WITH SIMULTANEOUS TOT'S. THE FOLLOWING INTERRELATED FACTORS WEIGHED AGAINST THIS ACTION AND IN FAVOR OF LAUNCHING TICO A/C ASAP:

(1) TIME ELEMENT: THERE WAS AN URGENCY TO LAUNCH MAX EFFORT FIRST STRIKE AT 042300Z OR AS SOON THERAFTER AS POSSIBLE.

(2) CONSTELLATION LAUNCH TIME: CONSTELLATION (CVA 64) HAD DEPARTED HONG KONG FOR NORMAL RELIEF OF TICO ON 6 AUG AND WAS CONDUCTING FLIGHT OPS IN SUPPORT OF THE DESOTO PATROL. THE EARLIEST ETA ON STATION WAS REPORTED AS 050500Z.

(3) VITAL IMPORTANCIS OF TICO TARGET: THE TICO FIRST STRIKE TARGET, VINH OIL STORAGE, WAS

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ASSIGNED NUMBER ON PRIORITY AND IT WAS DIRECTED THAT SUFFICIENT FORCE SHOULD BE APPLIED TO INSURE DESTRUCTION. IT WAS CONSIDERED QUOTE IMPERATIVE RPT IMPERATIVE THAT THE VINH POL STORAGE BE DESTROYED TODAY. IF TICO INITIAL STRIKE UNSUCCESSFUL RELOAD ASAP AND STANDBY UNQUOTE.

(4) DETERIORATING WEATHER: WEATHER IN THE VINH AREA WAS DETERIORATING AND PREDICTED IN THE AFTERNOON TO GO FROM BROKEN TO OVERCAST, 1500 FOOT CEILING WITH THUNDERSHOWER ACTIVITY.

F. QUESTION - THE LOC CHAU RAID APPEARS TO BE RELATIVELY LESS SUCCESSFUL, I.E., ONE ACFT LOST ONE DAMAGED, ONLY TWO PATROL CRAFT OUT OF SIX HIT. WHY?

ANSWER - FINAL PIERCE ARROW STRIKE RESULTS REPORTED BY CTG 77.6 INCLUDED ONLY FIVE CRAFT SIGHTED. DAMAGE REPORTED TAS 3 PGM SEVERELY DAMAGED, ALL BURNING, OR DOWN BY STERN; 2 P-4 MODERATE DAMAGE BOTH DIW. ABOVE ACCOMPLISHED WITH 9 SORTIES, 5 A-4C AND 4 A1H, ALL SUBJECTED TO AA FIRE PRIOR TO ROLL-IN ON TGTS. FINAL TALLY: 5 SIGHTED/5 HIT/ 3 SEVERE DAMAGE/2 MODERATE DAMAGE. DAMAGE ASSESSMENT BASED UPON EXCELLENT PHOT COVERAGE AND PILOT DEBRIEFS.

G. QUESTION - WERE TWO CARRIER TASK FORCES CAPABLE OF MOUNTING THE ATTACK ON ALL OBJECTIVES WHEN THE DECISION WAS MADE, AND IF NOT, WHY NOT?

ANSWER - THE CINCPACFLT PREPARE TO STRIKE MSG, DESIGNATING SPECIFIC TGTS WAS RECEIVED BY TICO AT 042055Z. THE JCS MSG CONTAINING ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE WAS RECEIVED AT 042210Z, THIS DID NOT PERMIT SUFFICIENT LEAD TIME TO QUOTE BY 0700 LOCAL 5 AUGUST CONDUCT A ONE TIME MAXIMUM EFFORT ATTACK UNQUOTE. DIRECTLY RELATED TO THIS QUESTION IS THE FACT THAT THE TICO HAD BEEN CONDUCTING CONTINUOUS, INTENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS FOR 29 HRS PRIOR TO AND OVERLAPPING THE LAUNCHING OF THE FIRST PIERCE ARROW STRIKE. THIS INCLUDED: YANKEE TEAM MISSIONS (032100Z-040300Z), DESOTO TARCAP AND AIR GROUP STRIKE TRAINING (040300Z-041045Z), DESOTO PT

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ATTACKS, TARCAP AND RECCE MISSIONS (041215Z-050300Z). IN ADDITION, ALL UP STATUS A4, A1 A/C AT CUBI PT WERE DIRECTED TO LAUNCH TO TICO ASAP AND JETS REPORTED OVERHEAD AT 050240Z. (TICO DECKLOADING AT THIS TIME FRAME IN FINAL TRANSITION STATUS BETWEEN YANKEE TEAM AND STRIKE POSTURE.)

4. REF B ASKED THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO EACH OF THE FIVE TARGETS:

A. DID FIRST PASS OF AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTER AA FIRE?

B. DO YOU CONSIDER THAT INITIAL RPT INITIAL SURPRISE WAS ACHIEVED INCLUDING RATIONALE FOR YOUR ANSWER?

C. REQUEST SOURCE OF INFO UTILIZED IN DAMAGE ASSESSMENT EVALUATION, E.G., PHOTO, PILOT DEBRIEF, "OTHER MEANS", ETC.

ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS FOLLOW:

(1) VINH/BON THUY

(A) NO AAA ENCOUNTERED ON FIRST PASS.

(B) INITIAL SURPRISE IS CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. 12 JETS MADE NEAR SIMULTANEOUS COORDINATED ATTACKS ON THE VINH POL AND AA COMPLEXES AND WERE FOLLOWED IN ONE TO TWO MINUTES BY ATTACKS BY 4 A1'S. NONE OF THE JETS ENCOUNTERED AAA FIRE ON THE FIRST PASS. A1'S ON THE FIRST RUN AND JETS MAKING SUBSEQUENT RUNS EXPERIENCED RAPIDLY INCREASING AAA OPPOSITION. NO AIRCRAFT HIT.

(C) DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OBTAINED FROM LOW AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY AND PILOT DEBRIEFS. MOST INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM PILOT DEBRIEFS.

(2) QUANG KHE

(A) NO AA FIRE ENCOUNTERED FROM REPORTED AAA SITE DURING FIRST ATTACK AT QUANG KHE. A/C WERE FIRED UPON BY PT/PGM BOATS DURING FIRST PASS.

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(B) LITTLE OR NO INITIAL SURPRISE OF BOATS APPARENT AT QUANG KHE. BOATS WERE GETTING UNDERWAY FROM PIER AT TIME FIRST RUN WAS COMMENCED. BOATS FIRED UPON ATTACKING AIRCRAFT ON FIRST AND SUBSEQUENT RUNS. NO AIRCRAFT HIT.

(C) DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OBTAINED FROM LOW ALT AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY AND PILOT DEBRIEFS. MOST INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM PILOT DEBRIEFS.

(3) HON ME: NOT ASSIGNED AS SPECIFIC TARGET BUT WAS INCLUDED IN ARMED RECCE MISSIONS. NO ACTION IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF ISLAND DUE WX.

(4) HON GAY.

(A) TGT WAS GROUP PGM/PT BOATS INNER HON GAY HARBOR. FIRST ATTACK ELEMENT WAS FLIGHT OF 10 A4C ACFT, FIRST ACFT ON TGT FIRST PASS FOL BY QTHR ACFT AT ABT TWO SEC INTERVALS. THIRD A4C IN FLT ENCOUNTERED AA FIRE FROM PGM/PT BOATS ON FIRST PASS, ABT 4-6 SEC AFTER FLT LEADER WAS ON TGT. NO SHORE BATTERY AA FIRE NOTED FIRST PASS.

(B) COMPLETE INITIAL RPT COMPLETE. INITIAL SURPRISE NOT RPT NOT ACHIEVED. RATIONALE: NO UNIT IS CAPABLE OF AA RESPONSE TO AIR ATTACK IN 4-6 SECONDS IN ANY BUT ALERT POSTURE. FACT THAT BOATS DID NOT FIRE AT FIRST TWO ATTACK ACFT INDICATES NO RADAR TRACKING. LACK OF AA FIRE FROM SHORE BATTERIES ON FIRST PASS, AND FACT THAT PGM/PT BOATS NOT UNDERWAY MAY INDICATE PERIOD OF ALERT BEFORE ATTACK VERY SHORT.

(C) DAMAGE ASSESSMENT BASED MAINLY UPON PILOT DEBRIEFS IMMED FOL RETURN FROM STRIKE, SUPPLEMENTED BY POST RECCE PHOT OBTAINED IMMED FOL A4 ATTACK. STRIKE SEQUENCE BEGAN AT 050740Z WITH 17 INDIVIDUAL BUT CLOSELY COORDINATED ATTACKS BY 10 A4C, FOL BY TWO RF8A PHOTO RECCE PASSES, FOL BY 13 INDIVIDUAL BUT CLOSELY COORDINATED ATTACKS BY FOUR A1H ACFT, ENDING 050803Z. LOW FUEL STATE RF8A PRECLUDED PHOTO PASS AFTER A1H ACFT OFF TGT.

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57

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING
MESSAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

~~SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

(5) LOC CHAU

(A) TGT WAS FIVE PGM/PT BOATS 1-2 NM OFF COAST-LINE. ATTACK ELEMENT WAS FIVE A4C ACFT AND FOUR A1H ACFT. ABOUT TWO MINUTES BEFORE RPT BEFORE FIRST TAKEN UNDER AA FIRE FROM BOATS. TOTAL OF 36 PASSES MADE BY 9 ACFT, WITH ONE A1H LOST DURING ATTACK. TOTAL OF SIX RF8A PHOTO RECCE PASSES MADE DURING AND AFTER ATTACKS.

(B) INITIAL SURPRISE NOT RPT NOT ACHIEVED. RATIONALE: A1/A4 AIRCRAFT TAKEN UNDER FIRE TWO MINUTES BEFORE ATTACK.

(C) DAMAGE ASSESSMENT BASED MAINLY UPON EXCELLENT POST STRIKE PHOTOS AND SUPPLEMENTED BY PILOT DEBRIEFS.

5. IN SUMMARY:

A. SHIPS WERE NOT DRAWN TO THE SOUTH BUT KEPT AT ABOUT 16N IN ORDER NOT TO PROLONG AIRCRAFT IN AIR.

B. SIMULTANEOUS STRIKES WERE NOT EMPLOYED AS TIME URGENCY AND TARGET PRIORITY EXPRESSED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY TOOL PRECEDENCE; CVA 64 APPROACHING FROM SE OF HAINAN REPORTED ETA LAUNCH POSITION 050500Z. WEATHER WAS DETERIORATING AND EXPERIENCE IN THE AREA MADE IT REASONABLE TO CONCLUDE THAT IT WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO, PARTICULARLY IN THE AFTERNOON. A RESTRIKE WAS INDICATED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY (JCS 042119Z) AND PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE IF FIRST LAUNCH WAS HELD UNTIL 051200H (050500Z) DUE WEATHER AND DARKNESS. CONVERSATIONS ON MUX WITH CINCPACFLT GAVE DEFINITE IMPRESSION THAT THERE WAS URGENCY THAT FIRST LAUNCH WENT OFF ASAP AND THAT RECEIPT OF INFO REGARDING TIME OF FIRST LAUNCH WAS URGENTLY REQUIRED.

C. ONLY TICO LAUNCHED RESTRIKE. 4 F8, 2 A4, 5 KA4 RECOVERED FROM FIRST STRIKE LAUNCHED ON RESTRIKE - BRINGING TOTAL RESTRIKE TO 4 F8, 10 A4, 5 KA4, 2 A1,

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~~SECRET~~

INCOMING
MESSAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

~~SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

AND 1 RFB OR A TOTAL OF TWENTY ONE. REASON FOR
RESTRIKE TO EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO INFLICT MAXIMUM
DAMAGE ON VINH POL AS DIRECTED BY CINCPACFLT 050403Z
AND 042014Z.

GP THREE

BT

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~~SECRET~~

ADDITIONS

ADD FRONT

04 AUGUST 1964

- ✓ 1. 1319Z (0919 Local) Gen. Wheeler to Adm. Grimm
- ✓ 2. 1323Z (0923 Local) Gen. Wheeler to Gen. McCutcheon
- ✓ 3. 1332Z (0932 Local) PAC D.O. to Adm. Grimm

ADD END

05 AUGUST 1964

- ✓ 1. 0438Z (0038 Local) Gen. Wheeler to Adm. Sharp
- ✓ 2. 0443Z (0043 Local) Gen. Wheeler to Adm. Sharp
- ✓ 3. 0511Z (0111 Local) PAC D.O. to Col. Smith
(SECDEF Office)
- ✓ 4. 0616Z (0216 Local) Adm. Sharp to Col. Moody
- 5. 0743Z (0343 Local) Adm. Sharp to Gen. Wisman
- 6. 0758Z (0358 Local) Gen. McCutcheon to Gen. Wisman
- ✓ 7. 0841Z (0441 Local) Gen. Wisman to Gen. Burchinal
- ✓ 8. 1008Z (0608 Local) Gen. Wisman to Adm. Mustin
- 9. 1230Z (0830 Local) Mr. McNamara to Gen. Milton
- 10. 1303Z (0903 Local) PAC D.O. to PAC Desk

M
UPI A144: HC
EDITORS:
GOLDWATER SUPPORT, BALBOA (A1381), SHOULD BE SLUGGED 1ST NIGHT LEAD
GOLDWATER (A77N), AND SIGNED BY JOHN GOLDSMITH, UNITED PRESS
INTERNATIONAL.
UPI LOS ANGELES
GS819PPD

UPI A145N HC
URGENT
2ND ADD 1ST NIGHT LEAD GOLDWATER, BALBOA (A138N) XXX WITH JOHNSON.
PRESS AIDE TONY SMITH, WHO WAS CRUISING OFF CATALINA ISLAND MOST OF
THE AFTERNOON WITH GOLDWATER, MADE A STATEMENT TO NEWSMEN AFTER RETURN-
ING TO THE PRESS HEADQUARTERS.
"THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES MADE THREE CALLS TO THE SENATOR
THIS AFTERNOON," SMITH SAID. WORD WAS RELAYED TO THE GOLDWATER PARTY
BUT BECAUSE OF POOR COMMUNICATIONS (GOLDWATER) WAITED UNTIL HE COULD
GET TO A LAND TELEPHONE.
SMITH SAID GOLDWATER CALLED THE PRESIDENT AT 7:07 P.M. PDT "AT WHICH
TIME THE PRESIDENT READ TO HIM A STATEMENT WHICH HE IS ISSUING LATER
THIS EVENING ON SOUTH VIET NAM."
GOLDWATER THEN AUTHORIZED HIS OWN STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S SMITH SAID.
GOLDWATER EARLIER MET WITH CALIFORNIA SENATOR CANDIDATE GEORGE MURPHY
BEFORE BEGINNING HIS CRUISE OFF CATALINA ISLAND ON THE FINAL DAY OF HIS
PRE-CAMPAIGN HOLIDAY.
(PICKUP 2ND PGH A77N: PRESS AIDES)

3d

GS822PPD
11:22 B/D

UPI A138N WA
BULLETIN
BALBOA, CALIF., AUG. 4 (UPI)--PRESIDENT JOHNSON TONIGHT READ HIS
STATEMENT ON THE TENSE SITUATION IN VIET NAM TO SEN. BARRY M. GOLDWATER,
THE REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. GOLDWATER EXPRESSED APPROVAL
OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT.
10:56E07 MORE M1056PED

1st

UPI A139N WA
URGENT
1ST ADD STATEMENT BALBOA, CALIF. (A138N) XXX PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT.
AFTER TALKING WITH JOHNSON AND HEARING THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
GOLDWATER ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:
"I AM SURE THAT EVERY AMERICAN WILL SUBSCRIBE TO THE ACTIONS OUT-
LINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT.
"I BELIEVE IT IS THE ONLY THING WE CAN DO UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
"WE CANNOT ALLOW THE AMERICAN FLAG TO BE SHOT AT ANYWHERE ON EARTH
IF WE ARE TO RETAIN OUR RESPECT AND PRESTIGE."
THE PRESIDENT FAILED TO REACH GOLDWATER AFTER THREE TELEPHONE CALLS
BECAUSE THE ARIZONA REPUBLICAN WAS CRUISING IN THE PACIFIC OFF
CATALINA ISLAND ABOARD A YACHT. RATHER THAN TALK WITH JOHNSON A SHIP-
TO-SHORE TELEPHONE, GOLDWATER RETURNED TO LAND AND CONTACTED THE
PRESIDENT ABOUT 7 P.M. PDT.
GOLDWATER PLANNED TO LEAVE CALIFORNIA FOR WASHINGTON AT 8 P.M. PDT
BY PRIVATE CHARTER AIRCRAFT. A GOLDWATER AIDE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE
CANDIDATE'S RETURN WAS UNRELATED TO HIS CONVERSATION WITH JOHNSON.
MJ1059RED.

2d

10:59



51 Republican National Committee

1625 EYE STREET, NORTHWEST WASHINGTON 6, D.C. NATIONAL 6-6800

NEWS

FOR RELEASE

FOR AUTOMATIC RELEASE
AUGUST 19, 1964
12:25 P.M.- CDS

REMARKS BY SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER TO THE
ILLINOIS STATE FAIR, SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS,
AUGUST 19, 1964

Back in 1854, the Illinois State Fair played an important part in one of the truly great political realignments in our nation's history. The speaker at the Fair, that year, was an up-and-coming politician named Abraham Lincoln. This is where he made his first really important speech along the lines that later brought the Republican Party into being as a Party of freedom.

There is just as important and potent a political force growing in the land today. And there is no better or more fitting place to talk about it than at this place and this time.

This growing force doesn't call for a new party. It calls for a renewal of faith in and an understanding of those political principles which gave the Republican Party its birth.

There are members of both parties -- and of no party -- here today. No one expects all of us to agree. But consider this: the Republican Party today is emerging clearly and unmistakably as the Party of freedom once again.

We are not talking of freedom in any sectional or special sense now, however. We are talking about freedom throughout our affairs at home. We are talking about freedom throughout the troubled world that surrounds and all too often confounds us today.

Can any thinking person have any real doubts about where the two parties stand on these issues today?

The entire fabric of the Republican Party platform is woven from dependence upon the individual, faith in the individual, trust of the individual.

(more)

In governmental affairs it is woven from reliance upon government closest to the people -- so that it can be controlled by the people and not exercise oppressive and remote control over the people.

In foreign affairs it is woven from belief that all men and all nations must be free to chose their own ways of life if there is to be real and lasting peace in the world.

And in regard to peace itself, the Republican platform and my personal pledge to you today and every day, is based upon a firm belief that only a strong America can be a peaceful America; that only a strong America can prevent war; that only a strong America can preserve the peace in which the false and failing ideology of Communism can be finally and fully rendered powerless.

Now let me suggest that whether you agree or disagree with those positions, you must admit, in all political honesty, that the present Administration stands for exactly the opposite position in each and every one of those basic matters.

It does not trust the people. It feels that the people, like children, must be told what to do, when to do it, and even how much to pay for it. And let's also be honest about this: some people prefer it that way.

But I don't buy for a moment that most people want it that way. And in November you are going to have a chance to prove it!

What of governmental affairs? The present Administration, as clearly as it can, says that local government can't cope with things anymore, that only the Federal level of government in Washington is wise enough to know what is best for you and your neighbors.

And once again, let's be honest. There are men in local government who are more than ready to turn their responsibilities over to Washington.

I want you to know that I'm proud to share this platform today with one outstanding American who wants your great state to take a different path.

Chuck Percy, your next governor, doesn't believe in running to Washington with every problem in every neighborhood or town in his great state!

(more)

He knows that people can solve their own problems in their own ways right at home -- and he doesn't just talk about it. As you know, he puts his beliefs into action.

Today, Chuck and I join hands across the years with those Republicans who built our Party. We join hands with them for the very reason that we are the freedom Party of today!

When it comes to the overwhelming issue of peace, the differences are just as dramatic between the two parties. I want to touch on that in some detail a bit later.

First, I want to go beyond the specifics and the details of political debate and mention a mood, a feeling in America today which may be as meaningful in the long run as any other factor of the political decision we must make this year.

You know and I know that there is something distinctly wrong when crime rises faster than our population.

You know that there is something distinctly wrong when common honesty and familiar morality are openly and widely challenged by the doctrine of the fast buck and the code of the off-color novel.

You know and I know that there is something wrong when the standards of drama and literature seek new depths rather than new heights; when pornography become a measure of talent.

You know and I know that there is something deeply wrong when law enforcement agencies are attacked for trying to do their jobs while open violations of civil order are defended.

I yield to no-one in my championship of every American's right to speak out, and speak out loudly, in his attempts to redress grievances. I yield to no man in my actions to support the redress of the grievances of those who have been wronged.

But I cannot as a citizen, I have not as a Senator, and I would not as President support or incite any American to seek redress to his grievances through lawlessness, violence, and hurt to his fellow men, or damage to his property.

In domestic affairs, a Federal Administration has no higher responsibility than to set examples of decent, honest, and moral conduct. Wherever

(more)

and whenever it puts politics first and principled action second, it sets the stage for lawlessness.

Telling people again and again that the Federal government will take care of everything for them, leads to the decline of personal and individual responsibility which is the base cause of the rise in crime and disregard for law and order.

Pitting class against class, or race against race, to reap the votes of one faction or another sets the stage for malice, where only open hearts, understanding minds, and willing hands ever will be fully effective.

Using positions of public power to feed private greed and gain sets the stage for lawlessness of other sorts: for the cynical disregard of ordinary honesty in our every-day lives, for the petty thefts that plague our stores and industries, for the hoaxes and swindles that plague our consumers.

I don't have to quote statistics for you to understand what I mean. You know. You have to face it every day on the front page of the back page of your paper. Every wife and mother -- yes, every woman -- knows what I mean.

There is a mood of easy morals and uneasy ethics that is an aching truth in our land. And no one in a position to set the examples that might set this right, can avoid responsibility for what is wrong.

Let me put it this way: there should be no skeletons in the closets of any part of the Federal structure, and that goes for the smallest agency right up to the White House itself.

Tragically, we cannot say that this is true today. Scandal haunts that Federal structure. The names and incidents that some are trying to turn into nothing but ghostly memories persist in coming to life; Billie Sol Estes, Bobby Baker, the six billion dollars for the Texas-built TFX--even though the services wanted another plane--the suppression or distortion of news in the name of news management. ✓

No greater domestic issue will be decided in this election, than the very climate, the very mood of government, the very manners of public servants and public service.

(more)

We offer you an honest Administration by honest men.

We know that most who work in government, at all levels, are honest. We pledge that their general honesty shall not be shadowed by the unpunished, or unexposed misbehavior of anyone else in government service, no matter how high or protected his position.

The highest honesty in public service, the most local and responsible level of government in public administration; the greatest self-reliance in personal development, the most individual responsibility in all of our lives: those are the ingredients of Republicanism at home.

But...now let me remind you of one shocking fact of our Twentieth Century life.

Nothing of what I've said will mean a thing in the long run if we cannot, in our time and by our skill and will as a nation, keep the peace of the world.

Nothing of what I have said may mean a thing for our children or our children's children, if we stumble into war the way we have three times before in this century.

Our political opposition does not want these matters discussed in this campaign. Foreign policy, they say, should be above argument.

I wish it were! I wish we had one on which all Americans could agree. I wish, above all, that we had a foreign policy that was working to keep the peace, working to preserve freedom, and working to confound Communism.

I don't think that you want to put a muzzle on the discussion of this life or death issue. I don't think that you want to think only of problems at home, when the world itself is burning with conflict, torn by conquest, and balanced always on the brink of the next Communist crisis.

I say that foreign policy is a major issue in this political campaign. I say it must be discussed. I only wish it could be debated by both the candidates for the Presidency.

And I am willing!

But I can understand why this Administration doesn't want to talk about it and why its leader won't debate it. The record is clear.

This nation has been prosperous under both parties. But this nation has gone to war under the leaders of only one party.

(more)

Only under Administrations such as this one have we become so weak that aggressors have been tempted to plunge the world into war. ✓

Only under Administrations such as this one have we closed our eyes to reality and had to open them to the sound of gunfire!

Many of us in the Republican Party have worked so very hard in the past years on behalf of the preparedness of this nation, that some critics try to make it appear that we are preoccupied by war, or eager to start one.

There is no greater political lie.

We understand that every war we ever have had to fight in this entire troubled century has come on the heels of weakness. We remember 1918--we remember Pearl Harbor--we remember Korea--we are watching Laos, and Vietnam, and the Congo--and we are worried.

Whether we like it or not--and I hate the idea as fervently as you do, believe me--this is the age of nuclear weapons.

We wish it weren't, but wishing won't make it so. The enemy has nuclear weapons.

And there is only one dependable way to make sure that they never use them: maintain our own nuclear strength and our ability to deliver it at a level so superior, in quantity and quality, that the enemy can never risk any conflict that might bring our superweapons into play.

This is deterrence. Had we been strong, when Nazism threatened, the second world war might have been averted. If we remain strong, the third world war can be averted.

And today -- let no one, particularly our enemies make any mistake about it -- today we are strong. We are secure in the armament of a strategic arsenal inherited from the Administration of Dwight Eisenhower.

It is tomorrow that worries all Americans. We know how strong we are today. Republicans built that strength.

We are worried by the undisputed fact that this Administration has decided to phase out the manned bombers which today account for more than 90% of our deliverable nuclear capacity -- the capacity that has kept the peace and can keep the peace. ✓

(more)

We are worried by the undisputed fact that under this Administration, with its utter disregard for strategic aircraft and for new, major strategic weapons systems, our deliverable nuclear capacity could be cut down by 90% in the next decade.

We have heard the Administration's attempts to explain away that figure. I've never seen so such statistic juggling in my life.

But the figure and the fact remains. Under this Administration, we are facing the decade of the 1970's with the very real prospect of a strategic force capable of carrying only one-tenth of the nuclear capacity that can be carried today.

Even that one-tenth will be a great power, of course. But will our enemy have stood still, as we are standing still? Will our enemy have abandoned research into advanced strategic systems, as we have virtually abandoned it? Will our enemy have abandoned the search for new defenses against nuclear attack, as we seem to have abandoned it? Will our enemy have curtailed the production of nuclear materials, as we have curtailed it?

What would this world be like, if Communism ever pulled even with or ahead of us in nuclear weapons? All Americans should think hard about that one. Not even one of Defense Secretary McNamara's chalk talks should stop us from thinking about that.

We have simply got to get this record straight. The Republican Party is the Party of peace.

It is the Party dedicated to the preparedness that can keep the peace.

It is the Party that can keep the peace because it best understands Communism -- which is today's only major threat to the peace.

I cannot imagine a Republican President, for instance, warning the Communists in advance of an action such as that recently taken in response to the attacks on our ships in the Gulf of Tonkin.

I cannot imagine, to go one step farther, a Republican President who would have let our policies in such an area become so confused that the enemy would have even risked such an attack in the first place; much less repeat it.

(more)

But what of the matter of warning them, once the decision -- which I fully supported -- had been made to destroy the shore bases from which the attacks had been launched?

The President gave the warning by going on national television, when a maximum audience was still available, but when our naval aircraft was still on the way to their targets.

The Administration says that the warning was given deliberately -- so that our people would learn of the attack before the enemy announced it and so that the enemy would not think we had embarked upon a broader action against them.

Now, in that time -- which amounted to nearly two hours warning in advance of the arrival of our first planes over their targets -- the enemy could have had time to prepare their defenses.

Certainly the element of surprise was shattered by the advance warning. Certainly the safety of our airmen was not the primary concern of such an advance warning.

I wonder, as a matter of fact, if the Joint Chiefs of Staff were as enthusiastic about the advance warning as they were about the operation itself.

The fact remains. We lost two planes in the action. One good American life was lost. Another airman was delivered into Communist captivity. The fact remains that we gave the enemy time in which they could have better prepared the defenses that shot down our planes.

The Administration has shown little skill when negotiating with the Communists. Now it appear they have as little skill when fighting with the Communists. For make no mistake about it; the Administration and its civilian generals, such as Field Marshal McNamara, take full credit for this remarkable strategy of warning our enemy that our planes were on their way!

America, and the whole free world, needs leadership in this nation that understands the enemy, understands how to deal with him, and is pledged to maintaining the strength and forging the determination that will keep him from risking the peace.

(more)

Republicans seek a strong America because we know that only a strong nation can keep the peace.

Republicans reject the present plans to disarm ourselves unilaterally. We call that reckless. We know that it is the sort of recklessness that has preceded every war of this century.

Peace is for those who are prepared; those who are strong; those who are dedicated. This is the America I know and love. This is the America, under God, which I am pledged to defend and to serve.

This is the America:

- self-reliant in its domestic affairs
- fully defended today and tomorrow
- re-dedicated in its morality and devotion to Constitutional order
- this is the America which can show the world the way to a

future of freedom, justice, and yes, peace.

###

✓ Paragraph
✓ just w charm + me
irreparable & unpardonable
successful after

... we know that the
... keep the
... to learn ourselves
... We call this
... that has preceded every
... those who are strong; those
... This is the America I know and love. This is the
... which I am pledged to defend and to serve.
... This is the America:
-- self-reliant in its domestic affairs
-- truly detached today and tomorrow
-- re-dedicated in its maturity and devotion to Constitutional
order
-- this is the America which can show the world the way to a
future of freedom, justice, and peace.

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH GEORGE REEDY

11:47 AM EDST

AUGUST 7, 1964

FRIDAY

MR. REEDY: The President has spent the morning in reviewing various reports and keeping in touch with both the international situation and the domestic situation.

I have no public announcements.

I have nothing to add to what has been previously said. If you have any questions, I will entertain them and I hope the answers are entertaining.

Q. Any schedule?

MR. REEDY: Nothing.

Q. Can we have a lid?

MR. REEDY: I am perfectly happy to give you a luncheon lid.

Q. Is there any possibility of the President traveling this weekend?

MR. REEDY: I don't know what the President will be doing this weekend, Al. In the event some news comes up--

Q. Please don't say it.

Q. Will Al be among the first to know?

MR. REEDY: I always make it a point of telling Al first because I love the expression on his face when he gets the news, but I have nothing to announce on that, and I do not know. If there are any developments, I will certainly report them as rapidly as I can.

Q. You don't know either way?

MR. REEDY: That is right.

Q. I am glad you nailed that one down, Carl.

MR. REEDY: That is the bulldog breed.

Q. What will the President be doing this afternoon?

MR. REEDY: I have nothing on the schedule.

Q. Can you tell us anything about his meeting with Governor Brown?

MORE

MR. REEDY: No, I have no information on that.

Q. Is the Governor still here?

MR. REEDY: I do not know.

Q. Do you know when the President is going to sign the Pay Bill, George?

MR. REEDY: No, I don't have the schedule.

Q. Not today?

MR. REEDY: I have no knowledge that he is signing it today.

Q. Was this a breakdown in communications or why was it, or was it weather, or why was it that the announcement of action was made here about 11:36 and it didn't take place until an hour-and-a-half later over there?

MR. REEDY: The President went on the air at the time that he did at the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense had verified that the planes were underway prior to the time that the President spoke and so reported to the President. It had been anticipated that the path of the aircraft to their targets would be within the range of the North Vietnamese radar. It was believed that the American people should be informed of the retaliatory action by their own Government rather than by reports from Hanoi.

Q. In other words, the President announced it before the planes actually got to their target? Is that what this adds up to?

MR. REEDY: It adds up to what I said. It adds up to the President going on the air at the time he did at the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

Q. That was an hour-and-a-half before they left the ship.

MR. REEDY: No. I said specifically that the Secretary of Defense had verified that the planes were underway prior to the time that the President spoke and so reported to the President.

Q. According to what the Secretary of Defense said yesterday afternoon, at 5:00, that was an hour-and-a-half before the planes left the ship.

MR. REEDY: I will accept whatever time the Secretary of Defense gave out. I said that it was anticipated that the path of the aircraft to their targets would be within the range of North Vietnamese radar.

Q. The Secretary of Defense admitted that he apparently made his own announcement before the planes left the ship. My question to the Government is--

MR. REEDY: Wait a minute, Sarah. I have no information that the Secretary of Defense said anything before the planes left the ship, Sarah.

MORE

Q. He said about 12:02 or 12:03 and the planes didn't leave until about an hour-and-a-half later.

MR. REEDY: I will refer you back to the Defense Department.

Q. I am taking it from the Defense Department.

MR. REEDY: I have not seen or heard anything from the Defense Department, Sarah, that there was anything like an hour-and-a-half before the planes left the ships.

Q. Were you worried for fear that Hanoi might scoop the White House? Seriously, now that the word might come--

MR. REEDY: It was felt that the first word should come from the Government of the American people of this retaliatory action.

Q. The President has told us in his office that if there were times when we felt we should see him that we should pass the word on through you. What happened this week and the kind of information that is coming out of such matters suggests that this would be the time to make such a proposal. Would it be possible to request through you a news conference?

MR. REEDY: Surely.

Q. George, all I am trying to straighten out here is this: The announcement apparently was made by the President and the Secretary of Defense in Washington before the planes hit. Is that correct?

MR. REEDY: The announcement was made by the President after he had been informed by the Secretary of Defense that the planes had left the ship.

Q. Had left the ship?

MR. REEDY: Right.

Q. As it turned out, had they actually left at that time or was there an error?

MR. REEDY: No, there was no error.

Q. An hour-and-a-half later they hit.

MR. REEDY: I don't know about the hour-and-a-half.

Q. What I am trying to verify is had the action actually taken place at the time of the first announcement here?

MR. REEDY: Sarah, at the time of the first announcement here, the planes had left the ship. We were so advised by the Secretary of Defense.

Q. As I understand it, they were several hundred miles of the place from target.

MR. REEDY: Several hundred?

Q. Yes.

MORE

Q. No, 60 or 70.

Q. The carriers weren't.

Q. The President was waiting throughout the evening until he got this word from Secretary McNamara?

MR. REEDY: Yes. The President was not going to speak until he had gotten this word from the Secretary.

Q. How much earlier could the President have made this announcement? That is to say, when was his statement? At what time was his statement finished?

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11:47 AM EDST

AUGUST 7, 1964

FRIDAY

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NEW YORK TIMES 5 AUGUST 1964

WASHINGTON POST 5 AUGUST 1964

Sea Clashes in Asia

PT Attacks Said to Show U. S. Need Of Small Craft With Conventional Guns

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on United States destroyers operating in the Gulf of Tonkin could have diplomatic and military implications aside from contributing to international tension.

Communist countries, experts on maritime law note, have frequently attempted to assert their sovereignty over gulfs, bays or seas partly enclosed by their land areas. The Gulf of Tonkin is bordered

News Analysis

by China's Hainan Island on the east, the Chinese mainland to the east and north and North Vietnam on the west.

The torpedo attacks could be another attempt to try to enforce a de facto interpretation by the Communists of their sovereignty over vast areas of the high seas.

This effort has always been resisted by the United States and other great maritime powers. President Johnson's orders to the Navy to shoot back represent another reinforcement of traditional American doctrine—freedom of the high seas.

The torpedo attacks could also reflect growing uneasiness in North Vietnam. There have been repeated hints from Saigon and Washington that North Vietnam might be attacked if aid to the Communist guerrillas in the South was increased.

Small-scale guerrilla operations across North Vietnam's land and sea frontiers have been conducted sporadically by South Vietnamese forces.

The United States Navy has created a counterpart of the Army's Special Forces. These are called SEAL units (Sea Air and Land). They are trained to carry out surreptitious intelligence missions, sabotage or other operations behind enemy lines.

The forces can be put ashore from submarines, gunboats or other small craft or can be parachuted or landed by sea-plane.

North Vietnam Tightens Guard

The threat of attack has forced North Vietnam, according to reports in Washington, to increase its beach patrols and coast watchers and to strengthen precautions against intelligence patrols, guerrillas, sabotage and air raids. Hanoi is represented as being "jittery."

However, the attack yesterday, coming two days after the attack on the Maddox, would seem to indicate considerably more than nervousness on the part of Hanoi. It may reflect a deliberate policy of attempting to goad the United States into retaliatory action.

From the United States Navy's point of view, the technical implications of the Gulf of Tonkin incidents are twofold. The attacks put attention

on an issue that has been of increasing concern to many naval officers in the age of the missile—the declining gun power of the United States fleets. They also underline the importance of the construction—until recently neglected—of small, fast motor gunboats or torpedo boats and shallow-water coastal craft.

The Maddox is one of the relatively few destroyers in the Navy that retain all their gun power.

Most old destroyer types have been modernized by FRAM-I and FRAM-II conversions (fleet rehabilitation and modernization) and some of their guns have been replaced by missiles and special antisubmarine warfare gear.

The Maddox, completed in 1944, still retains six 5-inch 38-caliber guns and six 3-inch 50-caliber.

Many other ships now have very limited gun power. The smaller vessels are equipped either with Terrier or Tartar antiaircraft missiles and the cruisers with Talos. These missiles have a limited dual-purpose capability against both surface and air targets, but their accuracy against sea targets is doubtful.

Most newer ships are armed chiefly with missiles.

The Turner Joy, which joined the Maddox on patrol in the Tonkin Gulf, still has three 5-inch 54 caliber guns and four 3-inch 50-caliber.

The craft, built in 1959, is due to be modernized and Tartar missiles may replace many of her guns.

The importance of defensive gunfire against the torpedo boat attack in the Gulf of Tonkin may mark—to the joy of many officers—the renaissance of the naval gun.

Vulnerability Increased

The reduced gun power of the fleet and the virtual elimination from large ship armaments of small caliber, rapid-fire guns—20 mm. and 40 mm.—tend to make large ships more vulnerable to torpedo boat attack.

This is especially true since some Soviet motor torpedo boats, roughly the same size as the North Vietnamese boats that attacked the Maddox, are now equipped with 15-mile cruise-type missiles designed for use against surface targets.

Another United States deficiency underlined by the attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin is the scarcity of high-speed, shallow-water coastal craft and motor gunboats, torpedo boats and patrol craft.

North Vietnam is believed to have about 50 high-speed craft of this type, built in Communist China or the Soviet Union. Communist China has more than 200, perhaps as many as 400.

President Johnson's Address to the Nation

The following is the official text of President Johnson's address to the Nation last night:

My fellow Americans:

As President and Commander in Chief, it is my duty to the American people to report that renewed hostile actions against U.S. ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to order the military forces of the United States to take action in reply.

The initial attack on the destroyer Maddox, on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes. The destroyers, and supporting aircraft, acted at once on the orders I gave after the initial act of aggression. We believe at least two of the attacking boats were sunk. There were no U.S. losses.

The performance of commanders and crews in this engagement is in the highest tradition of the United States Navy.

But repeated acts of violence against the armed forces of the United States must be met not only with alert defense, but with positive reply. That reply is being given as I speak to you. Air action is now in execution against gun boats and certain supporting facilities of North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations.

In the larger sense, this new act of aggression, aimed directly at our own forces, again brings home to all of us in the United States the importance of the struggle for peace and security in Southeast Asia. Aggression by terror against the peaceful villagers of South Vietnam has now been joined by open aggression on the high seas against the United

States of America. The determination of all Americans to carry out our full commitment to the people and government of South Vietnam will be redoubled by this outrage.

Yet our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. We Americans know, although others appear to forget, the risks of spreading conflict. We still seek no wider war.

I have instructed the Secretary of State to make this position totally clear to friends, to adversaries, and indeed to all. I have instructed Ambassador Stevenson to raise this matter immediately and urgently before the Security Council of the United Nations.

Finally, I have today met with the leaders of both parties in the Congress of the United States, and I have informed them that I shall immediately request

Congress to pass a resolution making it clear that Government is united in determination to take necessary measures to protect our sense of peace, freedom and justice in Asia. I have encouraged these leaders to introduce a resolution which I have introduced, and I have requested their support.

It is a limited force, strength, awesomeness, United. But it is a victory. Your presence. That means peace.

All of these are believed to be armed with small-caliber guns and torpedoes, not with missiles. Some reports have indicated that Communist China has some cruise-type missiles, apparently shore based.

The United States Navy recently bought several Norwegian-built, wooden-hulled motor torpedo boats and it has recommissioned four United States-built, aluminum-hulled boats.

In addition to these fast patrol craft (PCF), about seven motor gunboats (PGM), of con-

2 Reds Sunk In a 3-Hour Night Battle

By Tom Lambert
Of The Herald Tribune Staff

WASHINGTON.

North Vietnamese Communist torpedo boats attacked two American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin yesterday. The attack was the second on American ships in the Gulf in three days.

The latest attack was a bristling, night-time assault in which two of the Red boats were believed sunk and two others damaged by United States warships and their carrier-based jet plane escorts.

A Pentagon spokesman said last night:

"The attackers were driven off with no United States casualties, no hits and no damage to either destroyer," the spokesman said.

Reportedly enraged by the Red attack, President Johnson immediately summoned Congressional leaders from both parties to the White House for a report of the latest sea battle.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk and some members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff came to the White House for a Presidential meeting shortly before the congressional leaders arrived.

U. S. WARNING

It came shortly after the United States had warned North Viet Nam that "grave consequences" would follow if it staged "further unprovoked offensive military action against United States forces."

There was no indication immediately if the President would order any further response to the North Vietnamese

High Administration sources declined comment questioned on that point.

ships attacked yesterday were the Maddox and Joy. The Maddox fought off a three-boat Red day in the Tonkin Gulf, between the North coast and the Chinese Communist island of

Johnson Sunday ordered the Joy to join the the latter ship was attacked. The President anes to escort the destroyers and ordered allors to shoot to kill if attacked again.

RED ATTACK

"deliberate" attack on the Maddox and 10:30 p. m. Viet Nam time (10:30 a. m. while the destroyers were "cruising in patrol in the Tonkin Gulf in international waters 65 miles from the nearest land," the said.

said, "An undetermined number of torpedo boats" staged the attack. Other o six Red boats were involved.

y reports indicate the attack was a engagement in a turbulent sea, with s firing "lots of torpedoes," as one put it, and the American destroyers hall of shells, rockets and machine-

ation how close the Red torpedoes warships in the battles, which re- three hours from first contact until the fight.

ast two torpedo boats were sunk " by American fire, the Pentagon

before he called in the Congress- met with the National Security ruled several days ago.

It was unknown immediately if the sunken and damaged Communist boats were the victims of the American destroyers' fire or had been hit by the escorting jets from the carriers Ticonderoga and Constellation. The Ticonderoga has been operating off the North Vietnamese coast recently. The Constellation and three escorting destroyers sailed yesterday from Hong Kong.

Last night's sea fight apparently was at least as intense as Sunday's Tonkin Gulf battle when the Maddox fired 151 rounds of five-inch and 132 rounds of three-inch ammunition during a 21-minute engagement with three Red torpedo boats, and the destroyer's escorting jets lashed the attacking Communist craft with eight Zuni rockets and more than 800 machine-gun bullets.

One of the three Red boats was sunk and the other two damaged in that daylight fight.

With the entry of the Constellation's task force into yesterday's fight, the United States now has a powerful naval force in the Tonkin Gulf. It includes the guided missile frigate Gridley and the destroyers Fechteler and Preston escorting the Constellation, plus the Maddox, Joy and probable several other destroyers with the Ticonderoga.

The Pentagon spokesman did not give the precise location of last night's battle, but it apparently occurred near the scene of the Sunday attack.

The State Department's warning to North Viet Nam noted "grave consequences" would result if it staged any more assaults on American naval forces.

The warning was sent to the American Embassy in Saigon, apparently for forwarding to North Viet Nam through the three-nation (Canada, India, Poland) International Control Commission charged with supervising peace efforts in Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia.

The first, unofficial reports here about last night's fight indicated the Communists had used planes. However, informed sources said later that no Red aircraft had been involved.

Shortly after the attack reports began circulating, President Johnson summoned Republican and Democratic Congressional leaders to the White House. House Republican leader Charles A. Halleck, Ind., said he presumed the latest fight would be discussed.

Earlier, the President lunched with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and W. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Johnson's adviser on national security affairs, as well as the Security Council. It is assumed the battle was discussed at those sessions.

The Communist attacks on the American destroyers came shortly after the United States disclosed it was increasing by up to 6,000 the estimated 16,300 American military advisers and instructors now on duty in South Viet Nam.

It was uncertain, however, if the Red attacks were responses to the American build-up.

There is no doubt here the attacks were deliberate, as proven by their repetition. The North Vietnamese crews which attacked the Maddox Sunday in clear, sunny weather could have had no difficulty in sighting the ship's American flag. Last night's attack apparently came after the Communist radar locators spotted the two American warships.

The American destruction Sunday and last night of three North Vietnamese torpedo boats may have reduced markedly the Communist fleet of such craft.

"Jane's Fighting Ships" says North Viet Nam has 16 Russian-built P-4 motor torpedo boats. They are 50-ton high speed craft which carry several torpedoes each and are armed with heavy machine-guns.

HANOI PRESS SILENT

From Cable Dispatches

SAIGON.

With the U. S. S. Maddox under torpedo boat attack for the second time in three days, North Vietnamese still have not learned of the first attack. The Communist People's Daily in Hanoi, North Viet Nam's capital, made no mention of the attack as it exhorted the armed forces to be vigilant.

In South Viet Nam yesterday, another American special forces enlisted man was ambushed and killed along with four South Vietnamese soldiers with whom he was riding in a jeep. The five were returning to their base from a village where they were helping to clear fields for crops when they ran into a Communist Viet Cong ambush. The enlisted man was the 180th American to die in combat here since 1961 in addition to 84 other Americans who have died to other causes.

WALL STREET JOURNAL 5 AUGUST 1964

Defense appropriations of \$46.7 billion passed both the House and Senate yesterday. The measure includes \$207 million for recently approved military pay rises. The total is \$719 million less than Johnson requested and \$1.4 billion less than appropriated last year.



NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

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SUMMARY OF CARRIER AIR STRIKES AGAINST TARGETS IN NORTH VIETNAM

Following are the results, based on latest reports, of the 64 attack strike sorties flown from the U.S. Navy aircraft carriers USS TICONDEROGA and USS CONSTELLATION to five targets in the Gulf of Tonkin, North Vietnam:

- (a) Of the some 30 patrol craft sighted during the attacks, it is estimated that 25 patrol boats were destroyed or damaged.
- (b) Ninety percent of petroleum storage facility at VINH destroyed.
- (c) Seven (7) antiaircraft installations in VINH area destroyed or severely damaged.

The USS TICONDEROGA aircraft conducted three of the attacks against North Vietnam patrol boat concentrations and their associated support facilities. One strike was on the boats and facilities located at QUANG KHE. The second and third were on additional boats and activities at PHUC LOI and on the petroleum storage area located at nearby VINH. In addition, there was also a re-strike made on the VINH oil storage area.

The QUANG KHE attack, which took place at 1:15 a.m. EDT, was accomplished by 6 F-8 "Crusader" jets. The strike at PHUC LOI, including the nearby oil storage area at VINH, was conducted at 1:25 a.m. EDT by 6 F-8 "Crusader," 6 A-4 "Skyhawk," and 4 A-1 "Skyraider" aircraft. Ten A-4 "Skyhawk" and 4 F-8 "Crusader" jets participated in the re-strike at VINH at 4:45 a.m. EDT. An estimated 8 storage tanks were set ablaze during the first attack on VINH. From 2 to 4 additional tanks were set ablaze during the second raid.

Moderate antiaircraft fire was encountered during the first strike on VINH and 2 antiaircraft positions near the oil storage area were attacked and destroyed. During the re-strike, a heavier concentration of antiaircraft was encountered and an estimated 5 guns of a 6-gun position were subsequently destroyed.

One (1) "Crusader" aircraft sustained flak damage during the first attack on VINH but proceeded safely to DANANG, South Vietnam.

Navy aircraft from the carrier CONSTELLATION began a simultaneous attack on the remaining two targets, HON GAY and LOC CHAO at 3:45 a.m. EDT. Ten (10) A-4 "Skyhawks," 2 F-4 "Phantoms," and 4 A-1 "Skyriders," participated in the attack on HON GAY. Five (5) A-4 "Skyhawks," 3 F-4 "Phantoms," and 4 A-1 "Skyriders" participated in the raid on LOC CHAO.

MORE

Five (5) patrol craft were sighted during the attack on HON GAY and it was estimated that all 5 were destroyed. At LOC CHAO, 2 of the 6 patrol craft sighted were seriously damaged. Both attacks lasted 25 minutes.

Aircraft attacking HON GAY experienced moderate to heavy antiaircraft fire during the attack from numerous gun positions on the hill overlooking the harbor. Also, all operating guns aboard all of the patrol craft were fired throughout the attack. The Navy aircraft utilized 2.75" rocket and 20mm strafing attacks at both HON GAY and LOC CHAO.

One (1) A-4 "Skyhawk" from CONSTELLATION was shot down by antiaircraft fire during the attack on HON GAY. The pilot reported he was hit after completing his second attack on the patrol boats in HON GAY harbor. He indicated that his plane was uncontrollable and that he was ejecting. Witnessing pilots, who were also being subjected to heavy antiaircraft fire, indicated that they saw a splash approximately 3 miles from the harbor entrance, which could have been the downed "Skyhawk." A 60 second "beeper" which is normally activated when a chute opens was heard over the radio, but there has been no confirmed report of the sighting of a parachute. Lt. (JG) Everett Alvarez, Jr., of San Jose, California, previously reported as missing, was the pilot of this plane.

A second aircraft from CONSTELLATION, an A-1 "Skyraider" was lost due to antiaircraft fire during the attack on LOC CHAO. No parachute was seen and the aircraft was observed to crash into the sea in the vicinity of the LOC CHAO ESTUARY.

A third aircraft from CONSTELLATION, an A-1 "Skyraider" was hit by antiaircraft fire in the vicinity of LOC CHAO but made a safe return to the ship with minor damage.

END

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1

PRESS CONFERENCE - USA

with

**HON. CYRUS VANCE,
Deputy Secretary of Defense**

Interviewed By

**LOUIS DEROCHE,
French News Agency**

**RICHARD FRYKLUND,
Washington Evening Star**

**JACK RAYMOND,
New York Times**

**ROBERT LODGE,
Moderator**

(19)

P R O C E E D I N G S

VOICE: Press Conference, USA!

(Music. . .Up and out)

VOICE: From Washington, the Voice of America brings you Press Conference, USA, an unrehearsed panel discussion program in which a key figure in the news is questioned by three Washington correspondents.

Our guest this week is the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

To introduce our panel, here is Robert Lodge, the Moderator of Press Conference, USA.

LODGE: Deputy Secretary Cyrus Vance had been second ranking civilian official in the Defense Department since January of this year. He previously served as Secretary of the Army and General Counsel of the Defense Department. A naval officer during World War II, Secretary Vance served on destroyers. After the war he entered the practice of law, later served as Special Counsel to the Senate Armed Services and Space Committees before coming to work for Defense Secretary Robert McNamara at the Defense Department.

For both, America's military posture in Southeast Asia has been of major concern in recent days. Secretary Vance has visited the area several times.

To question the Deputy Defense Secretary, we have a panel of distinguished correspondents. Gentlemen, would you identify yourself.

DEROCHE: Louis Deroche of the French News Agency.

FRYKLUND: Richard Fryklund, Pentagon Correspondent for The Washington Star.

RAYMOND: Jack Raymond of the New York Times Washington Bureau.

LODGE: Now we will begin our questioning with Mr. Raymond who himself has just returned from a trip to South Vietnam.

RAYMOND: Mr. Secretary, has there been any military reaction from the Communists at all in light of our raids on North Vietnam, and if not, as indicated in recent reports, is it safe to assume that this particular military crisis is over?

VANCE: We hope very much, Mr. Raymond, that this military crisis is over. To answer your specific question, we have no indications of military movements since the action which was taken. However, I think it is reasonable to assume that the North Vietnamese may ask for combat air support from the Communist Chinese, and that such support will be given.

RAYMOND: Is there anything that we can do about that?

VANCE: No, there's nothing we can do about that.

LODGE: Mr. Fryklund.

FRYKLUND: Have you seen the reconnaissance photos of the damage done during the raids?

VANCE: No, I have not seen the photos, Mr. Fryklund. Those photos are still out in the Pacific. It will be several days before they will be received back in Washington.

FRYKLUND: Do you know what damage they show outside of the military bases that we've hit?

VANCE: I understand that they show very little damage outside of the military bases which were hit.

FRYKLUND: Was there a deliberate effort to confine the damage to the bases and if so, how did the Navy make this effort?

VANCE: There was a deliberate effort to select the specific targets, namely, the military bases which were to be hit and hit them with precision. The Navy had target folders on each of these installations and conducted their attacks in accordance with instructions which they received from their Task Force commander.

LODGE: Mr. Deroche.

DEROCHE: Sir, Mr. McNamara told us at his last press conference that North Vietnam does not have any military combat aircraft of its own. In that case, what would happen to the planes that they could receive from Peking. Would the Chinese aircraft have North Vietnam pilots, or Chinese pilots?

VANCE: We don't know the answer to that, Mr. Deroche, but we do know that some North Vietnamese pilots have been receiving training. As to whether any aircraft which would be supplied would be flown by North Vietnamese or by Communist Chinese we simply don't know the answer.

LODGE: Mr. Raymond.

RAYMOND: Mr. Vance, how do you feel about the reaction

abroad, that is, from our allies as well as from neutrals and foes?

VANCE: I think the reaction from both our allies and others throughout the world has been generally very favorable to the action which the United States took. The action which we took was in response to a deliberate, unprovoked attack in international waters. Our action was firm and prompt, and we hope very much that the firmness and promptness of our reaction will deter further acts of aggression by the Communists.

LODGE: Mr. Fryklund.

FRYKLUND: We did not retaliate to the first attack by the patrol boats. Why not?

VANCE: We did retaliate. We retaliated by sinking one of the boats which was attacking the destroyer Maddox.

FRYKLUND: But I mean we didn't strike then the bases of those PT boats. Why didn't we do it at that time?

VANCE: Because we assumed that perhaps the attack was one brought about by mistake. However, when the second attack occurred, it was quite clear that there was no mistake and therefore we retaliated.

FRYKLUND: How could the first one have been a mistake?

VANCE: The answer to that, Mr. Fryklund, it might have been possible that somebody in one of the patrol boats took action without consulting with his government and therefore it would be a mistake on the part of an individual.

LODGE. Mr. Deroche.

DEROCHE: We have been told, Mr. Secretary, that North Vietnam has lost a substantial part of its navy when 25 of its patrol boats were damaged or sank on Wednesday. Could you be more specific and give us your own estimate of the percentage of North Vietnamese naval losses due to the American action then?

VANCE: Ah, our reconnaissance photographs taken after the raid tend to substantiate the estimates made by Mr. McNamara at his first press conference. Namely, that about 25 of the boats were damaged or sunk. This is about two-thirds of the North Vietnamese naval fleet.

DEROCHE: Could you be more specific on what the North Vietnamese fleet consists of?

VANCE: It consists primarily of two types of craft. The so-called ^{SWATOW} ~~swatow~~ (?) gunboats and the PT-4 motor torpedo boats. There are also some sub-chasers, but the bulk of the fleet is of the first two types.

LODGE: Mr. Raymond.

RAYMOND: Mr. Secretary, the main front in Vietnam has been the insurgency front, in South Vietnam. And, assuming that this particular military crisis as well as all hope is over, that still leaves us with the problem of the guerilla warfare and the insurgency and counter-insurgency in South Vietnam. Has there been any indication as a consequence of the crisis the Viet Cong Communists have in fact stepped up a number of incidents, the harassments, and the other actions they've taken against the Government in

South Vietnam?

VANCE: We have no indications to that effect yet, Mr. Raymond, but I would assume that this is a most likely consequence of the activities of the last several days. So I would not be at all surprised to see a marked increase in Viet Cong activities.

LODGE: Mr. Fryklund.

FRYKLUND: Well, in that connection, Mr. Vance, this insurgency has been going on for a number of years. It has cost the United States an increasingly amount in men and supplies and money and most recently was announced that there would be a substantial increase in the number of people we are sending over there. How do you foresee the ultimate, what will be the end of the road for us in South Vietnam?

VANCE: We would hope, Mr. Raymond, that by the assistance which we are giving and will give to the South Vietnamese to permit them to so meet the Viet Cong insurgency that in the event they could control it and bring it to a situation where it could be controlled by police-type action rather than military force.

FRYKLUND: Well, do you see any sign of this happening because up until very recently, the opposite has taken place, the criminal harassments have increased now to the point where they constitute real military battles against the Government and what reason do we have now, does the Government have now that even the increase of say 4 or 5 thousand men--these are numbers that have been reported--would change this tide?

VANCE: I want to make it very clear, Mr. Raymond, that I think we're in for a long, hard frustrating war. And I can't predict, and I doubt if there's anybody who can predict how long this will go on. I think we can learn from history that it took over 10 years in Mylaysia to put down the insurgency effort; 8 years in the Philippines. So I think we are, as I said, in for a long, hard struggle.

LODGE: Mr. Deroche.

DEROCHE: Could you tell us, Mr. Secretary, when the present destroyer patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin is going to end? Will it resume from time to time to illustrate this country's determination to operate freely on the high seas?

VANCE: The patrol will end within the next few days, and similar patrols will be run again in the future.

VOICE: When the patrol ends will there be a hiatus, in other words, will there be a period in which there is no U. S. destroyer in the Gulf of Tonkin after the next few days?

VANCE: Mr. Raymond, this gets into operational matters which I don't think we should discuss.

VOICE: In the past, Mr. Secretary, have we always had a destroyer or some southern fleet ships in the Tonkin Gulf?

VANCE: No, we have not always had ships in the Tonkin Gulf. This has varied from time to time.

VOICE: Why is it necessary, Mr. Secretary, for our ships to patrol the ^{Gulf} ~~Gulf~~ of Tonkin?

VANCE: We do this on the high seas everywhere. It's necessary to find out the types of movements which are occurring there to keep us informed of activities which are necessary for our operations and intelligence.

LODGE: Mr. Fryklund.

FRYKLUND: Is there any dispute about the Tonkin Gulf being international waters? Do, yfor instance, Communist China and North Vietnam claim the Gulf as their territorial waters?

VANCE: Not to my knowledge. I think that they do claim a 12-mile limit as opposed to a 3-mile limit, but there is no claim that the Gulf of Tonkin is territorial waters.

FRYKLUND: Does the United States recognize the 12-mile limit?

VANCE: No, it does not. The United States recognizes 3-miles as the territorial limit.

FRYKLUND: Do our naval units ever sail closer than three miles to the shore?

VANCE: They do not.

FRYKLUND: Are they under specific orders not to?

VANCE: They are.

RAYMOND: Well, the real issue here is, I think, do they sail closer than 12 miles?

VANCE: They have sailed--

RAYMOND: They have.

VANCE: --sailed closer than 12 miles.

LODGE: Mr. Fryklund.

FRYKLUND: Is this the first time that American military action has been taken directly against a Communist country?

VANCE: I believe it is, Mr. Fryklund.

FRYKLUND: Does this represent a change in policy and is this perhaps a case of the hard-line officials taking over from the soft-line officials?

VANCE: No, it is not that at all, Mr. Fryklund. We had here, as I have previously stated, two acts of unprovoked aggression in high seas. Under those circumstances the only action which could be taken was an action to strike back and hit the source of the boats which were attacking our ships on the high seas.

FRYKLUND: In previous years during the cold war, our airplanes have been shot down by Communist countries and we have not replied in that way. Why not before and why now?

VANCE: In this case, Mr. Fryklund, as I have said, the acts took place in international waters on the high seas.

FRYKLUND: Is this crisis in any way like the Cuban missile crisis? Was there a danger during this one, for instance, of nuclear war?

VANCE: No, I do not believe there was any chance during this crisis of nuclear war; in that respect it was quite different than the Cuban missile crisis.

FRYKLUND: Is this one reason, the fact that there was less danger of nuclear war--is that one reason why we could hit

the North Vietnamese and have not hit Communist territory before?

VANCE: No, I don't think there's a parallel between the two. This was action taken in response to a deliberate act taken against us. Therefore the only response was clearly one to knock out the source of the offending vessels.

FRYKLUND: What if there is a third PT boat attack on a Southern Fleet ship, what will we do?

VANCE: Mr. Fryklund, I think it would be unwise for me to state anything other than our act will be firm and prompt as it was in the past.

LODGE: Mr. Deroche.

DEROCHE: About South Vietnam, Mr. Secretary, could you be more specific about the U. S. reinforcements that were on their way to Saigon before the crisis in North Vietnam took place? We have been told there were several thousand men on their way but we have seen figures ranging between 3 or 4 thousand to 5 or 6 thousand. So, could you elaborate on this and could you tell us also if you are still not sending any more men to South Vietnam in connection with the present crisis with North Vietnam?

VANCE: I would like to break this into two pieces.

First, the reinforcements that were announced prior to the recent crisis, and second, the reinforcements that were sent in after the crisis.

When General Taylor went out as the ambassador, he evaluated the situation together with General Westmoreland and

decided that it would be desirable to have additional personnel to assist in the efforts in South Vietnam. Accordingly, he made recommendations to Washington in this respect. These were reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the Secretary of Defense, by the State Department and by the President. It was determined that these requirements stated by Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland should be met.

Accordingly, a decision was reached to send several thousand to augment the forces already in South Vietnam. As to the precise number, all I can say at this time is that it is several thousand, because we are still working over the specific units to determine which ones are required, and therefore, I cannot give you a precise figure.

Now, with respect to the second half of the question, Mr. McNamara stated the other night that we have sent additional forces to the area as a precautionary measure. He pointed out that these were interceptor forces, fighter-bomber forces, that we were augmenting our naval forces in the South China Sea and that we are sending replacements from the Continental United States to the Western Pacific to replace the forces which were being deployed into South Vietnam and into Thailand.

LODGE: Mr. Raymond,

RAYMOND: Mr. Secretary, to continue with that, has this reinforcement, this crisis reinforcement in the Gulf of Tonkin reinforcement, has that operation now been completed or

do we expect that there will be still further deployments?

VANCE: Some of the units are still moving, Mr. Raymond, and they are not yet all in place. As to any future and further deployments, that will depend on what develops in the next few weeks.

RAYMOND: Well, we can assume then that if in fact it is true that this particular development Tonkin crisis is over, then the United States probably feels that it has no need to send any more forces than it already has ordered?

VANCE: That is correct.

RAYMOND: Yeah.

LODGE: Mr. Fryklund.

FRYKLUND: On what basis do we send these troops into Thailand? Who decided we can do that?

VANCE: This is done after prior consultation with the duly-constituted officials of the Thai government.

FRYKLUND: Are those both air and ground units or just air?

VANCE: Just air.

FRYKLUND: Where are they?

VANCE: I can't tell you.

RAYMOND: In that connection, Mr. Secretary, will there be any ground units going into Thailand? Or is it limited to just air--

VANCE: It is limited to air at this point.

RAYMOND: Yeah.

FRYKLUND: If we decide to send some ground units in there, where would they come from?

VANCE: Mr. Fryklund, I think it would be unwise for me at this point to tell you specifically where they would come from. You know that we have units in the Pacific; it is logical to assume that initial units if required, would probably come from there. If further required, they would come from the United States.

FRYKLUND: Would they come in by air or sea?

VANCE: Mr. Fryklund, this is a question that we will face at the time if the situation arises, and I hope it will never arise.

VOICE: Our military airlift capability has been greatly increased in recent years, has it not?

LODGE: Mr. Deroche.

DEROCHE: Mr. Secretary, it has been reported that the North Vietnamese thought that the Maddox had been shelling an island north of the 17th parallel, an island that was actually raided before by the South Vietnamese commandos. The stories go on to say that North Vietnamese opened fire by mistake on the Maddox. Do you care to comment on the incident and could you tell us if there is a liaison and what kind of liaison there is between the Seventh Fleet and the South Vietnamese Navy?

VANCE: Mr. Deroche, all I would care to say is that, as

Mr. McNamara pointed out yesterday, there have been large scale infiltrations into South Vietnam from North Vietnam by the sea. As a result of that, over the last several years, the Vietnamese have developed a junk fleet and have augmented that with certain patrol boats prevent these infiltrations from the sea. Now from time to time these operations have moved up across the 17th parallel to try and stop the infiltrations to the north.

FRYKLUND: Was there one of these raids the day before the Maddox was first attacked?

VANCE: I've said all I think I should on this, Mr. Fryklund.

RAYMOND: Mr. Secretary, in that connection, it's probably related to this, but it's not been a few days since these military developments and there's still considerable speculation and I know that you don't like to get into speculation about the motives of the North Vietnamese. But at the same time what is the prevailing belief among officials like yourself as to why the North Vietnamese might have precipitated this clash.

VANCE: Mr. Raymond, as I've said before, I really don't know the answer to this, and my speculation is no better than the speculation that has appeared in the newspapers; it runs the gamut from 1 to several different alternatives. And therefore, I think it would be unwise of me at this time to further that speculation.

FRYKLUND: Isn't there any way that the North Vietnamese^e could have stood to gain by this sort of a ~~lock~~ lock?

VANCE: That again is a question which I can't answer, Mr. Fryklund.

LODGE: Mr. Deroche.

DEROCHE: Mr. Secretary, do you have any official news now on the fate of Lt. Alvarez and is he now a prisoner of war in North Vietnamese hands and what efforts are being made by the United States Government to obtain his release through neutral channels?

VANCE: We have received press accounts to the effect that Lt. Alvarez is in North Vietnamese hands. We do know that he ejected from his plane at the time that it was shot down. Therefore, there is a strong possibility that he may be in North Vietnamese hands. As I understand it, the State Department is taking the necessary effort to ascertain whether or not he is in fact in North Vietnamese hands and to obtain his release.

RAYMOND: What's the normal procedure, Mr. Secretary, for obtaining the release of Lt. Alvarez, assuming that this is all so. How would the United States go about it, what channel do we have?

VANCE: It would do this Mr. Raymond through neutral channels and establish contact with the Government involved and thus seek to obtain his release.

RAYMOND: Would we pick another country that has dealings with North Vietnam--

VANCE: That's correct.

RAYMOND: --then ask them to intervene for us, is that it?

VANCE: That is it.

RAYMOND: Has that country been picked?

VANCE: I think you'd have to ask the State Department about that.

RAYMOND: All right.

LODGE: Mr. Fryklund.

FRYKLUND: When we were warning North Vietnam after the first attack not to do it again, what channels did we use to get the warning to them and are we sure they got the word.

VANCE: The President of the United States made a public statement, Mr. Fryklund, which I think was clear warning to them not to do it again.

FRYKLUND: But we do not have direct diplomatic links with North Vietnam?

VANCE: No, we do not.

RAYMOND: Mr. Secretary, we have had contact with Communist China over the years, particularly in the talks in Warsaw. Did we use that contact here now?

VANCE: I don't know the specific answer to that, Mr. Raymond.

FRYKLUND: Do you know if we used the hot line between the White House and the Kremlin during this crisis?

VANCE: I do not know.

FRYKLUND: Would it be logical? Is that what the hot line is for, to tell the other side our intention our position and try to ascertain their intentions, their positions, do it fast? Is that what the hot line is all about?

VANCE: The hot line is for such use as the President deems necessary or desirable, Mr. Fryklund. And I think that's all I should say about it.

LODGE: Mr. Deroche.

DEROCHE: Mr. Secretary, how can it be explained that the attacking North Vietnamese PT boats came very closely, very close earlier this week to the two American destroyers and none of the enemy boats scored any hits, inflicted any casualty or damaged the American vessels. Was that due to fault or obsolete equipment in the hands of the North Vietnamese or was it poor marksmanship on their part?

VANCE: I would attribute it to the skill of the captains of the destroyers involved. I happened to have served in destroyers myself, so I know a little something about this. With a skillful captain, if he handles the ship well, it is possible to avoid a torpedo attack. In this case, it would appear to me the captains of the ships handled themselves in splendid fashion.

FRYKLUND: What does the American navy think of the skill of the North Vietnamese patrol boats?

VANCE: I have not talked to anybody specifically with respect to that question yet.

LODGE: As a former Navy man, Mr. Secretary, what is your estimate?

VANCE: My estimate is that, as I said before, our people deserve a great deal of credit for the way they handled themselves in this particular crisis. I think that the tribute should go not only to the captains of the ships, but also to their gunnery crews, who obviously did a good job of fending off these attackers and sinking them.

FRYKLUND: Do you know how many torpedoes were fired against our destroyers?

VANCE: We do not have a precise fix on this. We have an estimate which runs to, I believe, about 9 torpedoes. But again this is not a firm figure yet.

FRYKLUND: And none of them hit?

VANCE: None of them hit.

FRYKLUND: Did any come close?

VANCE: Yes, one came between 100 and 200 yards from one of the ships.

LODGE: Mr. Secretary, aside from the events of the past week how would you evaluate the current status of the war against the Viet Cong guerillas in South Vietnam, how's it been going?

VANCE: Well this is a very complicated problem, as Mr. Raymond and Mr. Fryklund know from their visits out to this area. In May of last year, with the Buddhist crisis, we entered into a very troubled period, which was followed by the coup

against Diem and subsequently by the second coup at which time President--Premier Khanh came to power. During this time there was a tremendous turnover of personnel, as I recall it of the 41 province chiefs, all have turned over at least once. Of the principal military commanders, each of them has turned over at least twice. As a consequence of this, there has been great turmoil within the country and it's logical to expect that it turned out the way it in fact did, namely, that during this period of turmoil and crisis the Viet Cong increased their activities and we lost ground to the Viet Cong.

When President Khanh came in however, he took hold in a strong fashion and since that time the downtrend I believe has been halted and at the present time, I think we're on a plateau and starting to move slightly upward.

I would point out, however, that this has not decreased the number of terroristic attacks carried out by the Viet Cong. Indeed these have continued to rise.

RAYMOND: Mr. Secretary, in that connection, again looking into the future and as you've pointed out, this is going to be a long, hard war. It's your opinion that you can't have-- you probably can't have a perfectly neutral North Vietnam. Under the circumstances even if you succeed in pacifying South Vietnam and if North Vietnam cannot be made to be neutral, it presumably will continue to infiltrate so that you always have this problem. Will this problem continue forever with South Vietnam always

harassed by the North? Do you see any situation in which some kind of peace can be established?

VANCE: I'm very hopeful that eventually the Communist Chinese and the North Vietnamese will cease their acts of aggression. When that time occurs then peace is possible. Until that is done, I doubt that peace is possible, Mr. Raymond.

LODGE: I'm sorry to interrupt, gentlemen, but our time has expired.

Thank you for being with us on Press Conference--USA.

(Music . . . Up and fade)

VOICE: You have been listening to Press Conference-USA, a weekly discussion program broadcast by the Voice of America. Our guest was Deputy Defense Secretary Cyrus R. Vance. The news correspondents were Jack Raymond of the New York Times, Richard Fryklund of The Washington Star, and Louis Deroche of the French News Agency.

The Moderator was Robert Lodge.

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NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301

PLEASE NOTE DATE

56

FOR THE PRESS:

August 7, 1964

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Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Sylvester made the following statement today at 3:15 P.M. EDT:

Because there is apparently some confusion in news reports today about the timing of the announcement of the U. S. retaliatory action Tuesday, August 4, I have secured the following statement from the Secretary of Defense, a statement which is attributable to him:

"I recommended to President Johnson that he schedule his announcement of the retaliatory attack against the North Vietnamese torpedo boats and their supporting installations for 11:40 P.M., August 4, because:

"1. By that time U. S. naval aircraft had been in the air on their way to their targets approximately one hour.

"2. Hanoi, through its radar, had then received indications of the attack.

"3. The time remaining before the aircraft arrived over their targets would not permit the North Vietnamese to move their boats to sea or to alert their forces.

"4. It was important that the people of our country learn of the manner in which their government was responding to the attacks on its vessels from their President rather than from Hanoi which was expected to announce the attack at any moment.

"5. It was desirable that the North Vietnamese government and others be told as soon as possible the character of the attack -- 'Our response for the present will be limited and fitting. We ... know ... the risks of spreading conflict. We will seek no wider war.'

"As you know, the North Vietnamese government did not have time to move their forces; our attacking aircraft found the torpedo boats at their docks; the attack was highly successful."

END

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HONORABLE CYRUS R. VANCE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Interviewed by

BILL DOWNS, ABC TELEVISION

Thursday, August 6, 1964

QUESTION: Well, Secretary Vance, as you know, the American people have been deeply concerned by this crisis in the Far East. Before we had sort of a foot in the door through our military aid to South Vietnam, then after August 4, things changed. How do you assess it now? Are we in this thing up to our knees now, up to our hips, up to our armpits, or what?

SECRETARY VANCE: I wouldn't put it that way, Mr. Downs. We have indicated from the outset that we would do everything that is required to help the South Vietnamese put down the counterinsurgency which is being directed against them by the Viet Cong who in turn are directed by the North Vietnamese and we will continue to do so in the future. Insofar as the act of aggression which occurred on the high seas, the United States took limited action to promptly . . . and that is the only action which could be taken.

QUESTION: In sort of your own viscera, to you feel then that this is not a step to World War III?

SECRETARY VANCE: We certainly hope it is not. We have, as I said, taken limited action and we hope this will deter any further aggression acts on the part of the North Vietnamese. Nevertheless, we are taking precautions.

QUESTION: With the announced movements of men and ships and planes to the crisis area, how much will you have to increase the draft callup now?

SECRETARY VANCE: I don't believe we will have to increase the draft callup at all.

QUESTION: Do you plan to call up any reserves or any reserve specialists such as doctors?

SECRETARY VANCE: No, we do not unless the situation should worsen.

QUESTION: Do you plan to order the families of dependents, I mean the dependents of families of Service men out of . . . I'll take that question over. Do you plan to order dependents -- the families of Servicemen and diplomats say

in Saigon and other parts of the SE Asia crisis area -- do you plan to call them back home?

SECRETARY VANCE: No, I don't have intention of doing that at this time. This would only occur if the situation should worsen markedly.

QUESTION: The President has expressed hopes of avoiding escalation of the war, but does not the fact that we are sending reinforcements to that area mean that there has been an escalation?

SECRETARY VANCE: Yes, in a sense there has been an escalation brought on by the unprovoked attack against our vessels on the high seas. However, the precautionary steps which we have taken in moving in interceptors and fighter-bombers and strengthening our naval forces in that area is an attempt to prevent further escalation.

QUESTION: Well, it's been 48 hours maybe not quite since that first attack and people have been wondering why, why would the Communists take such a rash and surprising action. There are many theories floating around, do you have any favorite theory?

SECRETARY VANCE: No, I don't, Mr. Downs. It's very hard to understand why they did take this action and it would be sheer speculation on my part to try to interpret at this time.

QUESTION: Well, on another facet of the same question. Is there any indication that the attack might have been diversionary -- a prelude to other actions, say in Laos or Cambodia, say India or Malaysia or even Korea?

SECRETARY VANCE: Well, we know that the Communists have been carrying on aggressive acts against Laos, South Vietnam and now most recently on the high seas.

QUESTION: Well, have there been any indications of troop movements or other belligerent activity in any of those areas?

SECRETARY VANCE: We have had no indications of that; however, as Mr. McNamara has indicated earlier today, I think it is reasonable to assume that the North Vietnamese may ask for combat air support from the Communist Chinese and it may be provided.

QUESTION: If this air support does show up, will this mean that Communist China has intervened directly in the dispute?

SECRETARY VANCE: I would certainly say this would be an unfriendly act.

QUESTION: Would it mean direct intervention -- I mean, would there be Chinese pilots flying those planes?

SECRETARY VANCE: It would be speculation on my part. I couldn't really answer.

QUESTION: What would be our reaction to this unfriendly act?

SECRETARY VANCE: We will take whatever acts are required when the situation arises.

QUESTION: Were we surprised by the apparent sophistication -- if that is the word -- of the Viet Cong attack, both in having a flotilla of PT boats locate a destroyer in the dark in rough and bad weather, and secondly, in their defenses in shooting down our planes?

SECRETARY VANCE: No. I wouldn't characterize it as sophisticated. We did know that the North Vietnamese have patrol craft which had radar and we also know that it is possible to shoot down both jet aircraft and propellor-driven aircraft with automatic weapons which are of not too great a sophistication.

QUESTION: Do you believe that the Chinese Communists will intervene after what we had heard particularly from their propaganda attacks?

SECRETARY VANCE: I would hope, certainly hope, they would not. It would be rash on my part to speculate on that question, however.

QUESTION: We have no direct diplomatic contact. It's a very indirect connection that we do have with the Peiping government through Warsaw. Have we been in contact with them or attempted to establish contact with them through Warsaw or other means, since this incident?

SECRETARY VANCE: That is a question I'm afraid you'll have to ask the State Department.

QUESTION: Well, how do you feel about it after two days of living through the -- and sleeping here, too, I presume?

SECRETARY VANCE: That's right.

QUESTION: Do you feel your family is safe, you yourself are safe, that the country is safe?

SECRETARY VANCE: Yes, I certainly do feel that the country is safe. We hope very much that the rapid and firm response which was taken will indicate to the Communists that they should not attempt any further aggressions of this type.

MR. DOWNS: Thank you very much, Sir.

E N D

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HONORABLE CYRUS R. VANCE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Interviewed by

BILL EVENSON
MUTUAL BROADCASTING SYSTEM

THURSDAY, AUGUST 6, 1964

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, along the border in Vietnam there is a feeling of an anticipated attack from the north at some time, reportedly in the near future, and our recent movements in that area lead many to believe that if this attack should come, possibly we would be involved deeper than we have been. What are your feelings on that, sir?

SECRETARY VANCE: Well, we hope very much that the actions which have been taken will indicate the firmness of our resolve. We also hope that it will be perfectly clear that the United States will not stand idly by when they are subject to unprovoked attack on the high seas, as recently occurred on two separate occasions. The United States is prepared to take any action which will be required by the circumstances, but we hope that the firmness of the action which we have taken will indicate to the Communists that it would be unwise for them to take any further aggressive acts.

QUESTION: Well, now, on the recent retaliation strikes of 64 sorties that were made we had a loss of two planes and a damaging of two planes. Some circles feel that the type of sorties, the type of retaliation moves we made, that this would represent percentage-wise a high loss. Would this be your feeling?

SECRETARY VANCE: No, I don't believe it's a high loss. Of course, we deeply regret the loss of any American. However, I think that the operation was carried out in an excellent fashion. As a matter of fact, Mr. McNamara and Admiral McDonald have awarded unit citations to all of the personnel involved in the engagements which took place on August 2 and August 4.

MORE

QUESTION: Do you feel that Red China will offer air support for North Vietnam or will it be requested of them?

SECRETARY VANCE: I believe that there is a strong possibility that the North Vietnamese may request combat air support from the Communist Chinese. As you know, the North Vietnamese do not have any combat aircraft. I also think it is likely that such air support might be provided.

QUESTION: Now, there have been a number of reasons given for the recent attacks on our Navy ships by the North Vietnamese, and I'm sure you've heard them and perhaps have discussed them undoubtedly--do you concur with any or any one particular reason that has been offered?

SECRETARY VANCE: It would be very rash indeed to speculate on what the reason was for the actions which have been taken. I personally find it very difficult to ascertain what the motives are which led to two unprovoked attacks in international waters, and I think it would be rash of me at this point to try and speculate on what motivated those attacks.

QUESTION: We've heard the statement that we're ready for anything--and I'm certain that we are--but does this possibility, or does this mean there could possibly be a possibility, of, for example, using nuclear weapons in something of this nature?

SECRETARY VANCE: No, I don't think there is any possibility of using nuclear weapons. I think that our conventional weapons will be perfectly adequate to contain any further aggressive acts that may be launched against us.

QUESTION: Now, in both attacks, as we understand it, on the American destroyers, the Commanding Officer used his own authority to return fire, to take evasive action, one thing and another. Assuming there was not time to contact any higher authority--for example, Washington, or anything of that nature--would this be the case in the future. In other words, would the field commanders again have this alternative that they could take it upon themselves?

SECRETARY VANCE: The field commanders from the outset have had the authority to defend themselves and to take action to destroy any attacking craft.

MORE

QUESTION: Has any information reached the Pentagon indicating there may be some undue movements of the North Vietnamese troops, that is, since August 2.

SECRETARY VANCE: Of the North Vietnamese troops? No, we have no indications to that effect.

QUESTION: None whatever has reached here? There was prior to that I know, but I was wondering from, say, the last few days.

SECRETARY VANCE: We have no indications of any such movements.

QUESTION: Has there been any indication reaching the Pentagon that activities in the Vietnam area is today anything other than what we have learned to recognize as normal activities?

SECRETARY VANCE: No, it's normal as of tonight.

QUESTION: Now, getting along into one thing, I'd like to find out what the present situation is as far as your personal views are concerned in connection with the draft call-up, the reserve, or something of that nature. How does the nation stand on that?

SECRETARY VANCE: I do not believe it would be necessary unless the situation should worsen markedly to increase the draft calls or take any other steps along that line.

QUESTION: Will this also include, for example, reserves?

SECRETARY VANCE: Yes.

QUESTION: Could you give us somewhat of an evaluation as to the importance of the Tonkin Bay in connection with our overall operation in Vietnam?

SECRETARY VANCE: Well, I think that the action which took place in Tonkin Bay indicates that the United States will not tolerate unprovoked aggression on the high seas. The United States was on a patrol there in international waters and it was attacked without any provocation by North Vietnamese vessels. Under those circumstances we responded and will in the future to any aggression.

MORE

QUESTION: Recently Red China mentioned, and are on record as a matter of fact, that they will look upon any attack on North Vietnam as an act of aggression by the United States against China. Will this alter our plans in any way, or have we basically been assuming this?

SECRETARY VANCE: We will take whatever action is required under the circumstances.

QUESTION: And, finally, I would like to ask you this, do you feel at the present time that we are now involved in aiding Vietnam in any way, shape or form--either militarily or financially--any more today than, say, we were prior to August 2?

SECRETARY VANCE: No, we have indicated from the outset that we would do whatever is required to assist the South Vietnamese to carry on their war against the Viet Cong, which in turn is being directed by the North Vietnamese. We will continue to do what is required to win that war.

MR. EVENSON: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

E N D

NEWS CONFERENCE

OF

HONORABLE ROBERT S. McNAMARA
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

- - - - -
THE PENTAGON
- - - - -

Thursday, August 6, 1964

5:00 P. M.
- - - - -

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen: I have four brief announcements to make, after which I will endeavor to answer your questions.

First, there have been no further enemy attacks on our vessels operating in the Gulf of Tonkin since I spoke to you last night.

Secondly, the routine patrol of our destroyers operating in that gulf, in the area shown on this map, between Hainan Island and the coast of North Viet Nam, has been resumed.

Thirdly, the preliminary analysis of the photo reconnaissance taken following our strikes yesterday tends to confirm the damage assessment which I reported to you yesterday morning. You recall that at that time, I stated our aircraft striking the bases of the patrol boats at Hon Gay, Loc Chao, Phuc Loi, Quang Khe had destroyed or damaged approximately twenty-five of the torpedo boats; that in addition, our aircraft striking at the petroleum storage dump at Vinh, in support of the patrol boats, had destroyed 90 percent of that storage dump.

At Vinh is located about 10 percent of the petroleum storage capacity of North Viet Nam. The additional information brought out by the photo-reconnaissance analyses is that in addition, we destroyed approximately seven of the anti-aircraft installations at Vinh.

(MORE)

Fourthly, I have asked Admiral McDonald to award the Navy Unit Citation to the men of the ships and aircraft participating in the operation, both in recognition of their bravery and also in recognition of the effectiveness of their operations. Admiral McDonald has enthusiastically agreed with that recommendation and is taking steps to put it into effect.

Now I will be happy to try to answer your questions.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, does our Government have any information from the North Vietnamese Government through diplomatic channels about the possible prisoner?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No, we have not received any such information, but we are taking steps to endeavor to obtain his release, if he has been captured, as has been alleged by them.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Radio Hanoi claims that North Viet Nam shot down eight attacking U. S. planes Wednesday and damaged three others.

SECRETARY McNAMARA: I think this is typical of the veracity of their reports. We lost two aircraft, as I reported to you yesterday, one an A-4, which is a jet attack aircraft, Naval aircraft, and the other an A-1, which is a propeller driven Naval aircraft, both operating off the carriers TICONDEROGA and CONSTELLATION. In addition, there was minor damage to two other aircraft, both of which returned safely.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you have any information over the last four days that would indicate the Chinese Communists made any military efforts to assist or respond with the North Vietnamese, to respond to our attacks?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No, I have no information that the Communist Chinese in any way assisted the North Vietnamese in their attacks on our vessels. I think it probable that the Communist Chinese will introduce some combat aircraft into North Vietnam in support of them. As I told you before, North Vietnam does not possess any combat aircraft of its own.

(MORE)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you say you think it is highly probable. Does that mean you already have indications?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No, I have no indications of it, but I would think that that would be a likely response.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, have you had any word one way or another that there has been a third incident of any kind as claimed by Radio Hanoi?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No, we have no indication of any third incident. There have been no attacks or hostile actions directed toward our vessels operating in the gulf. I explained to you yesterday that our routine patrol is functioning in this area (indicating) and moving South. We have two carriers, the TICONDEROGA and the CONSTELLATION, in approximately this position (indicating). They, in turn, are escorted by destroyers. There have been no attacks or reported attacks or attempted attacks at any of the vessels operating in that area.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, have there been any incidents that you know of involving the South Vietnamese vessels and North Vietnamese?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No, none that I know of, although I think I should mention to you the South Vietnamese Naval Patrol activities that are carried on to prevent the infiltration of men and materiel from the North into the South. In the last seven months of 1961, for example, about 1400 men were infiltrated across the 17th parallel from North Viet Nam into South Viet Nam. To prevent further infiltration of that kind, the South Vietnamese, with our assistance, have set up a naval patrol which is very active in that area, which continues to inspect and examine junks and their personnel. In one 8-month period that I can recall they discovered 140 Viet Cong infiltrators.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there have been reports about considerable troop movements by U.S. aircraft in South Viet Nam to the 17th parallel. Could you give us an assessment about those?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: We have, to the best of my knowledge, moved no South Vietnamese troops nor have we moved U.S. troops into South Viet Nam. We have, as I reported to you yesterday, moved interceptor aircraft into South Viet Nam to be prepared for whatever eventuality develops. We have, in addition, moved certain fighter aircraft into South Viet Nam. We moved certain fighter aircraft into Thailand. We made reinforcements of our advance bases in the Pacific; reinforcements moved out of the United States for that purpose. We have moved certain fleet units; I mentioned the attack carrier group moving from the First Fleet, which is homed in Pacific waters off the Pacific Coast, out into the Western Pacific, and we also moved an anti-submarine task group down into the South China Sea, this in order to provide protection to our carriers and destroyers operating in these waters, both in the Gulf and in these waters South of Hainan Island.

(More)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you tell us why you think it is highly probable that the Chinese will move planes into North Viet Nam?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: As they have no combat aircraft of their own, I would assume that they would make such a request and that it would be answered.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the Nationalist Chinese reported rather large troop movements on the mainland through the province of Yunann. Is there any indication that there was a large-scale Communist --

SECRETARY McNAMARA: We have no indication that there have been any substantial movements of Communist Chinese forces either by land or air.

QUESTION: In the months preceeding ...

SECRETARY McNAMARA: I am speaking now of the recent past, the last few days. I know of no large movements of the kind you suggested, for that matter, during the past several months.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, it has been some 48 hours now since that first attack. In studying the situation further, have you arrived at any answer to the mystery of why this was done?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No, I can offer no explanation. We considered a number of alternative explanations, but it would be sheer speculation on my part to express them to you, and I think it would be better not to do so.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you said that the South Vietnamese patrols which are inspecting junks were set up with United States assistance. Could you tell us what form that assistance took?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Yes. At the time we began the expanded program of assistance to South Vietnam in December 1961, at which time we analyzed in some detail the extent of infiltration during the previous six months. It was on that basis that I reported to you the very extensive infiltration that took place then. We concluded the best form of prevention would be the establishment of a junk patrol. To that end, we provided the funds necessary to construct about 500 junks. These fall into four categories: Command junks, which are motorized, carry a crew of about ten men, are armed with automatic weapons, equipped with radios; motorized sailor junks, which are also armed, which patrol the coasts; sailing junks, which act as picket ships to carry out surveillance of particular areas; and motor junks, without sails. This force of some 500 junks was constructed in the shipyards of South Vietnam, equipped with engines, in some cases, supplied from this country, and generally financed by the Military Assistance Program of this country,

QUESTION: And they operate on their own?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: They operate on their own. They are part of the South Vietnamese Navy, commanded by the South Vietnamese Navy, operating in the coastal waters inspecting suspicious incoming junks, seeking to deter and prevent the infiltration of both men and materiel from North Vietnam into South Vietnam.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do these junks go North, into North Vietnam waters?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: They have advanced closer and closer to the 17th parallel, and in some cases I think have moved beyond that in an effort to stop the infiltration closer to the point of origin.

QUESTION: Do our Naval vessels afford any cover for these junks in those operations?

(MORE)

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Our Naval vessels afford no cover whatsoever. Our Naval personnel do not participate in the junk operations.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, if the North Vietnamese are holding an American pilot, does it appear that it is your Lt. Alvarez?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: There is some indication that if they hold one of our pilots, it is he.

QUESTION: What are the indications?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: We believed that he bailed out of his aircraft. There was an indication from the automatic beeper attached to a parachute that he did so.

QUESTION: What sort of status does a man like this have and what steps can be taken?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: He is a captive of war and we would seek through neutral channels to obtain his release. Whether we are successful in doing so, I don't know, but we are bringing to bear every possible pressure to that end.

I have time for one more question, gentlemen.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you said the destroyer patrol had been resumed in the Gulf of Tonkin. Was it broken off?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: It was broken off during the attack upon it in the darkness the night before last and, of course, during the action of yesterday it was also broken off. But it has been resumed and will continue until completed some time later this week or early next.

QUESTION: Sir, --

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Thank you.

One question.

QUESTION: -- are the reinforcements semi-permanent? In other words, if there is no additional incident in a week or two weeks, will these planes start coming back?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: The reinforcements will stay in position as long as required.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

- E N D -

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HONORABLE ROBERT S. McNAMARA
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Interviewed

by

NEIL STRAWSER, CBS-TV

7:30 P. M., EDT

Wednesday, August 5, 1964

QUESTION: Secretary McNamara, have your continuing reconnaissance reports during the day changed in any way your earlier estimate of the damage inflicted on those North Vietnam bases?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No, not at all. During the day we've carried out post strike reconnaissance using aircraft from the two carriers TICONDEROGA and CONSTELLATION and these reconnaissance aircraft and the photos that they have supplied to the carriers have supported the estimates we made earlier in the day. At that time you may recall that we reported we had attacked the four torpedo bases at Hon Gay, Loc Chao, Phuc Loi, Vinh, Quang Khe, and we stated we had destroyed the supporting facilities of the bases and had either damaged or destroyed about 25 of the patrol craft themselves.

And in addition, we attacked the Vinh oil storage area which is associated with the Phuc Loi base and supports the other bases as well. This base at Vinh contains about 10% of the total petroleum capacity of North Vietnam, we destroyed 90% of that 10%.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did your reconnaissance flights meet with any anti-aircraft fire?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No, None.

(MORE)

QUESTION: The earlier air strike did?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Yes, they had.

QUESTION: Do you feel that this mission has been accomplished then?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Very successfully.

QUESTION: Why do you think that the North Vietnam carried out the PT boat attacks in the first place?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: I can't say. It was deliberate, unprovoked aggression on the high seas. It would be sheer speculation on my part to attempt to explain the reason for that attack.

QUESTION: The North Vietnamese have made one reaction. They have claimed that they have shot down five of our aircraft. You said, I believe, we lost two.

SECRETARY McNAMARA: We lost two aircraft and we had one damaged. Earlier today I believe I said two. But it turned out there was only one damaged, and that aircraft that was damaged landed at Da Nang in South Vietnam. It had very minor damage and will be shortly returned to the fleet.

QUESTION: The North Vietnamese also claim to have captured an American pilot. Does that seem borne out?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: That is possible. We, as I say, lost two aircraft -- one an A-1 aircraft and the other an A-4 aircraft -- each of these contained one pilot. We believe one of the pilots was lost, one of the pilots may have landed in North Vietnam.

QUESTION: Returning a moment to the strike of the torpedo boat bases, do you still hold to the figure of about 25 boats?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Yes, I think that about 25 of the craft were either damaged or destroyed.

QUESTION: Is that just about the sum total of the North Vietnamese . . .

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No, I suspect they have perhaps a quarter to one-third of their patrol boat force operational. But the bulk of them have been eliminated from operational use.

(MORE)

QUESTION: Do you consider that still a threat?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No, I think that the strike was highly successful.

QUESTION: Do you see any sign of any other response from the North-Vietnamese at this point?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: None so far.

QUESTION: No other provocation?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: They may continue their aggression on the high seas. If they do we will certainly respond as we have both on Sunday and again yesterday and today.

QUESTION: Are there any other spots where they might commit provocation?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: They are carrying out unprovoked aggression in Laos, in South Vietnam and more recently on the high seas. I think this is the pattern of aggression that is typical of what we can expect from the Communist Chinese and their allies.

QUESTION: Well, you have taken several measures to move in reinforcements in Southeast Asia -- planes and ships and anti-submarine warfare unit. You have alerted some ground forces. Did you take these steps because you thought there might be some reaction?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: These are purely precautionary steps taken to deter further action. Whatever further action occurs will occur in response to aggressive initiatives of the North Vietnamese or their Communist Chinese backers.

QUESTION: Do you feel that the reinforcements being moved in could handle any eventualities?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Yes. As you implied, we have moved in very substantial reinforcements. We have moved in interceptor aircraft, for example, and fighter-bombers into South Vietnam, we've moved fighter bombers into Thailand we've moved an antisubmarine warfare force into the South China Sea to protect our attack carriers and their accompanying destroyers. We've moved very substantial interceptor and fighter bomber forces from the United States into advance bases in the Western Pacific.

(MORE)

We've moved an attack carrier task force from the First Fleet which operates off the Pacific coast into the Western Pacific. We've alerted and readied for movement selected Army and Marine units.

QUESTION: What might be the range of our response if there are further provocations?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Our response will be firm and, as President Johnson said, it will be limited and it will be relevant to the aggressive actions of the North Vietnamese.

QUESTION: Would that mean, for instance, that if they bomb South Vietnam, that we would bomb their bases in return?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: I wouldn't wish to predict exactly how we would respond, but I would say we'd respond in a fashion similar to that of the last day, in which when they attacked us at sea using torpedo boats, we destroyed their torpedo boat capability.

QUESTION: It can be assumed that bombing of cities and civilian population would be about the last alternative?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Yes. I think it is important to recognize that today we were attacking isolated marine facilities, and these facilities were not associated with civilian population centers and therefore there were very few civilian casualties.

QUESTION: This was kind of an old-fashioned warlike incident, too, with an airstrike and conventional bombs. Is there any point where tactical nuclear weapons . . .

SECRETARY McNAMARA: I see no reason to think that our conventional capabilities are not sufficient to respond to the type of aggression we can expect from North Vietnam.

QUESTION: So far we have been talking about North Vietnam. Elsewhere in the Communist world the Russians have been cautious so far. And the first reaction from the Communist Chinese is to accuse President Johnson of playing politics. Do you have any fear of military intercession by either of these powers?

(MORE)

M.S

SECRETARY McNAMARA: I can't predict their actions. I can only say we are prepared for whatever action they undertake.

QUESTION: The reinforcements you sent in would take care of that?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Yes, and we have further reinforcement capabilities we have not yet called upon.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you spent the night in the Pentagon here last night and you spent many nights here during the Cuban Crisis. How would you compare your feelings these past twenty-four hours with your feelings in the crisis then?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: There are many similarities I think between the action the last twenty-four hours and the Cuban Crisis and some very great differences, too. In the case of the Cuban Crisis nuclear weapons were armed, in operational condition, and poised to be launched against this country. In that sense it was a much more dangerous crisis. On the other hand our response in each instance was a controlled application of the tremendous power which we have. As President Johnson indicated, we seek no wider war, but we will respond with firmness and we will insure that any aggressive action against our forces is met with power and force and pressure against the aggressor. That was true in the Cuban Crisis and it's certainly been true in the last forty-eight hours.

QUESTION: Personally how do you react to these crises. With nervousness, tenseness . . . or what . . . ?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: With lack of sleep.

QUESTION: Incidentally, how did you sleep last night to receiving those reports during the night?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: With about 3-1/2 hours of sleep during the night. I'm looking forward to leaving here and going home immediately.

QUESTION: You are not going to spend the night here tonight?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No, I will not spend the night here tonight.

QUESTION: Thank you very much, Secretary of Defense McNamara. And now back to Harry Reasoner in New York.

- E N D -

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HONORABLE ROBERT S. McNAMARA
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Interviewed by

PETER HACKES, NBC-TV

9:15 P.M. EDT

Wednesday, August 5, 1964

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, it's been just about 12 hours now since you met with us here in this room. What can you tell us now to bring us up to date on the situation in the Tonkin Gulf?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: We've carried out photographic reconnaissance missions during the past 12 hours over the target areas. The photographs from these missions have been analyzed and they confirm essentially the reports that I gave earlier today. We have damaged or destroyed about 25 of the North Vietnamese patrol craft, the torpedo boats which attacked our destroyers August 2 and August 4. In addition, we have damaged and destroyed the support facilities and base facilities for those craft--certainly the anti-aircraft emplacements protecting those bases and about 90% of the petroleum storage dump at Vinh. At Vinh is located about 10 percent of the total storage capacity of petroleum in North Vietnam.

QUESTION: Well, then, how successful would you characterize last night's strike?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Well, I think highly successful, both from a purely military point of view in terms of damage incurred, and also highly successful in the sense that we have made it unmistakably clear to the North Vietnamese we will not tolerate deliberate unprovoked attacks on our vessels operating in international waters on the high seas.

MORE

QUESTION: During these 64 sorties, Mr. Secretary, what weapons did the planes use?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: The planes were loaded with bombs, rockets, and 20mm shells.

QUESTION: Was the damage mostly from the bombs?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No, I think that the majority of the damage resulted from the rockets.

QUESTION: In light of the two American casualties, Mr. Secretary, would you say it was actually worth it?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: The loss of one American life is a tragedy, but I think all Americans would agree that it's absolutely essential that our ships have the right to operate on the high seas in international waters, and that in the event that they are attacked in international waters, we must respond by bringing our power against the aggressor, deterring him from future attacks.

QUESTION: Are things mostly peaceful at this hour?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: There are no military operations being carried on at the present time other than the routine patrol of the Maddox and the Turner Joy in the Gulf of Tonkin.

QUESTION: And under what orders are they continuing their patrol?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: They're under the same orders that they operated under earlier this week. They are to respond to any attack by, not only driving off the attacker, but by seeking to destroy him as well.

QUESTION: Is there any thought, Mr. Secretary, of increasing this patrol in that general area?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No, there is no need to. The functions of the patrol can be carried out by the two vessels presently on patrol.

QUESTION: Among the theories advanced after the first attack on Sunday was that this may have been an accident on somebody's part. Could you come up with that conclusion now?

MORE

SECRETARY McNAMARA: I think it was reasonable to expect after the first attack that it might have been an accident, that it might have been a miscalculation, a mistake, but it's perfectly apparent after the second attack that occurred on August 4 that there was a pattern and a deliberate attempt to destroy our destroyers operating on the high seas. This could not be thought to be an accident or a mistake.

QUESTION: What about the theory that some people have that the Communists did not think we would strike back or at least not this hard?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: They should have learned by now that we will respond rapidly and firmly to any aggression against our forces.

QUESTION: I believe it was at the second of the two National Security Council meetings yesterday that it was decided to send the planes on the strikes at North Vietnam. } *

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Yes, that is correct.

QUESTION: Can you tell us anything about the mood of what went on at that meeting?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: I think everyone present recognized we are facing a very perilous situation, a very serious situation. There was a soberness of mood and attitude in discussion, but a firmness of purpose and an unanimous recommendation to the President that we respond as we did.

QUESTION: Was there a delay--there was a delay, I should say--in announcing the strike thrust last night. Can you explain that--it was several hours?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Yes, because, of course, with the decision taking place in the late afternoon it was necessary to inform the Commanders in the Pacific. They, in turn, to brief their pilots, load their airplanes, and launch those craft across approximately 200 miles of water to their targets. This took several hours and until such time as the planes were over the target it was unwise to inform either our nation or the world of the action we had underway.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you've had a hectic couple of days now--the most serious, the most delicate period since the Cuban Crisis. How does it feel sweating out a crisis that could conceivably draw us into a war?

MORE

SECRETARY McNAMARA: As I said, I think that all of us who have been associated with these crises--the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 and, more recently, the events of the past two days, face them recognizing they are serious, they are perilous situations. And this introduces a soberness into one's behavior and attitude, but also, I think, we face them with a firmness and the results indicate that firmness.

QUESTION: You slept here in this building last night, Mr. Secretary. Are you going to sleep again here tonight?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No, I slept all too limited last night. As a matter of fact, about 3-1/2 hours to be exact.

QUESTION: Will you be sleeping here again?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: I expect to go home immediately after this program.

QUESTION: Well, is that our cue? Can we now say that the naval crisis in Vietnam is over?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: If your communications are as good as mine with the naval forces in the Pacific, yes.

INTERVIEWER: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. This is Peter Hackes, NBC News in the Pentagon.

E N D

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Not for Publication
Until Released by the
Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT S. McNAMARA
BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS AND ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES

August 6, 1964

Chairman Fulbright, Chairman Russell, and members of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees:

During the past few days, deliberate and unprovoked military attacks by the North Vietnamese have given rise to the need for us to appear here today. I should like to review the attacks with you briefly and to describe the responses we made to those attacks.

The first incident occurred on August 2. It concerned the USS MADDOX, one of our destroyers engaged in a routine patrol in International waters of the Gulf of Tonkin off the North Viet Nam coast. At about noon, when the MADDOX was about 30 miles from the coast, she reported that three torpedo boats were on a southerly course heading toward the ship at a range of over 10 miles.

Two hours later, at approximately 2:40 P.M., the MADDOX was approached by a high speed -- 45 to 50 knot -- craft. She reported that the apparent intention of this craft was to conduct a torpedo attack and that she intended to open fire in self-defense if necessary. She was attacked by the three PT craft at 3:08 P.M. She opened fire with her five-inch battery after three warning shots failed to slow down the attackers. The PTs continued their closing maneuvers, and two of the PTs closed to 5,000 yards, each firing one torpedo. The MADDOX changed course in an evasive move and the two torpedoes passed on the starboard side at a distance of 100 to 200 yards.

The USS TICONDEROGA, which was operating in waters to the southeast and which had been alerted to the impending attack, advised she was sending four already airborne F-8E (CRUSADER) fighters with rockets and 20 mm ammunition to provide air cover for the MADDOX. At about 3:21 P.M., the third hostile PT moved up to the beam of the MADDOX and received a direct hit by a five-inch round; at the same time it dropped a torpedo into the water which was not seen to run. Machine gun fire from the PTs was directed at the MADDOX. However, there was no injury to personnel and no damage. The MADDOX continued in a southerly direction to join with a sister destroyer, the C. TURNER JOY, as TICONDEROGA aircraft commenced attacking the PTs. ZUNI rocket runs and 20 mm strafing attacks were directed against two of the PTs, and they were damaged. The third PT remained dead in the water after the direct hit by the MADDOX. At 3:29 P.M., the engagement terminated and the aircraft escorted the MADDOX southward on its patrol course.

On Monday, August 3, the President made public instructions that he had issued the day before regarding future patrols and engagements with enemy craft. He instructed the Navy, first, to continue the patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin; second, to double the force by adding an additional destroyer to the one already on patrol; third, to provide a combat air patrol over the destroyers; and fourth, to issue instructions to the combat aircraft and to the destroyers (a) to attack any force which attacked them in international waters, and (b) to attack with the objective of not only driving off the force but of destroying it.

At the same time as these instructions were being broadcast throughout the world, the State Department, acting pursuant to the President's further instructions, took steps to deliver a note of protest to the North Vietnam regime. The note was also widely publicized. It concluded with the words, "The United

States Government expects that the authorities of the regime in North Viet-Nam will be under no misapprehension as to the grave consequences which would inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against United States forces."

Our hopes that the firm defensive action taken in response to the first attack and the protest to Hanoi would end the matter were short-lived.

After the first attack on Sunday, the MADDOX joined with its sister destroyer, the USS TURNER JOY, in the Gulf of Tonkin and resumed its patrol in international waters, as directed by the President.

Monday, August 3, was uneventful.

The patrol was also uneventful during most of the daylight hours of Tuesday, August 4. In the early evening of August 4, however, the MADDOX reported radar contact with unidentified surface vessels who were paralleling its track and the track of the TURNER JOY. It was 7:40 P.M. when the MADDOX reported that, from positions being taken by those unidentified vessels, an attack by them appeared imminent. At this time the MADDOX was heading southeast near the center of the Gulf of Tonkin in International waters approximately 65 miles from the nearest land.

The MADDOX at 8:36 P.M. established new radar contact with two unidentified surface vessels and three unidentified aircraft. At this time, U. S. fighter aircraft were launched from the TICONDEROGA to rendezvous with the MADDOX and the TURNER JOY to provide protection against possible attack from the unidentified vessels and aircraft, in accordance with the President's previously issued directives. Shortly thereafter, the MADDOX reported that the unidentified aircraft had disappeared from its radar screen and that the surface vessels were remaining at a distance. The aircraft from the TICONDEROGA arrived and commenced defensive patrol over the MADDOX and the TURNER JOY.

At 9:30 P.M., additional unidentified vessels were observed on the MADDOX radar, and these vessels began to close rapidly on the destroyer patrol at speeds in excess of 40 knots. The attacking craft continued to close rapidly from the west and south and the MADDOX reported that their intentions were evaluated as hostile. The destroyers reported at 9:52 P.M. that they were under continuous torpedo attack and were engaged in defensive counterfire.

Within the next hour, the destroyers relayed messages stating that they had avoided a number of torpedos, that they had been under repeated attack, and that they had sunk two of the attacking craft. By Midnight local time, the destroyers reported that, even though many torpedoes had been fired at them, they had suffered no hits nor casualties and that the defensive aircraft from the TICONDEROGA were illuminating the area and attacking the enemy surface craft. Shortly thereafter, they reported that at least two enemy craft had been sunk although low ceilings continued to hamper the aircraft operations. The TURNER JOY reported that during the engagement, in addition to the torpedo attack, she was fired upon by automatic weapons while being illuminated by searchlights.

Finally, after more than two hours under attack, the destroyers reported at 1:30 A.M. that the attacking craft had apparently broken off the engagement.

The deliberate and unprovoked nature of the attacks at locations that were indisputably in international waters compelled the President and his principal advisers to conclude that a prompt and firm military response was required.

Accordingly, the President decided that air action, in reply to the unprovoked attacks, should be taken against gun boats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which had been used in the hostile operations. On Tuesday evening, after consulting with Congressional leadership, he so informed the

American people.

The United States military response was carefully planned and effectively carried out. The U. S. air strikes began approximately at noon Wednesday local time against North Vietnamese PT and gun boats, their bases and support facilities.

These reprisal attacks, carried out by naval aircraft of the United States Seventh Fleet from the carriers TICONDEROGA and CONSTELLATION, were limited in scale -- their primary targets being the weapons against which our patrolling destroyers had been forced to defend themselves twice in the prior 72 hours.

Specifically, our naval air forces launched 64 attack sorties against 4 North Vietnamese patrol boat bases and their boats and against a major supporting oil storage depot. Strike reports indicate that all targets were severely hit, in particular the petroleum installation where 10% of North Vietnam's petroleum storage capacity was 90% destroyed. Smoke was observed rising to 14,000 feet.

Some 25 North Vietnamese patrol boats were destroyed or damaged.

Our losses were two aircraft destroyed and two damaged. One of the pilots is believed to have crashed with his plane between two PT craft he had under attack. An other pilot reported that he was ejecting from his downed aircraft. His whereabouts is at present listed as unknown.

In view of the unprovoked and deliberate attacks in international waters on our naval vessels and bearing in mind that the best way to deter escalation is to be prepared for it, the President and his principal advisers concluded that additional precautionary measures were required in Southeast Asia. Certain military deployments to the area are therefore now underway. These include:

- a. Transfer of an attack carrier group from the Pacific Coast to the Western Pacific;

b. Movement of interceptor and fighter bomber aircraft into South Vietnam;

c. Movement of fighter bomber aircraft into Thailand;

d. Transfer of interceptor and fighter bomber squadrons from the United States to advance bases in the Pacific;

e. Movement of an antisubmarine force into the South China Sea;

f. The alerting and readjusting for movement of selected Army and Marine forces.

In the meantime, U. S. destroyers with protective air cover as needed, continue their patrol in the international waters of the Gulf of Tonkin.

The moves we have taken to reinforce our forces in the Pacific are in my judgment sufficient for the time being. Other reinforcing steps can be taken very rapidly if the situation requires.

This concludes my descriptions of the two deliberate and unprovoked North Vietnamese attacks on U. S. naval vessels on the high seas; of the United States reprisal against the offending boats, their bases and related facilities; and of the precautionary deployment and alerting steps we have taken to guard against any eventuality.

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NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301

PLEASE NOTE DATE

FOR THE PRESS:

August 5, 1964

NO. 576-64

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63

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara today identified targets in North Vietnam under attack by U. S. carrier aircraft as follows:

Hon Gay - Patrol boats and associated facilities.

Loc Chao - Patrol boats and associated facilities.

Phuc Loi - Patrol boats and associated facilities.

Vinh - Oil storage.

Quang Khe - Patrol boats and associated facilities.

END

PRESS BRIEFING

By

HONORABLE ROBERT S. McNAMARA
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

9:00 a.m.

Wednesday, 5 August 1964

SECRETARY McNAMARA: As you know, on August 2nd, and again on August 4th, North Vietnamese surface vessels attacked U. S. destroyers operating on routine patrol in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin.

In retaliation for this unprovoked attack on the high seas, our forces have struck the bases used by the North Vietnamese patrol craft. During the night, 64 attack sorties were launched from the U. S. carriers TICONDEROGA and CONSTELLATION against the four North Vietnamese patrol bases and certain support facilities associated with those bases.

The points are located on this map showing the Gulf of Tonkin, South China, North Viet Nam. The first base is at Hon Gay in North Viet Nam; the second at Loc Chao; the third at Phucloi; the fourth at Quang Khe; and the fifth strike was against the Vinh oil storage depot, which is associated with the Swatow torpedo base.

The oil storage depot, which contains 14 tanks, approximately 10 percent of the total petroleum storage capacity of North Viet Nam, was 90 percent destroyed. Smoke was observed rising to 14,000 feet. In addition to the damage to the torpedo boat bases and their support facilities, approximately 25 of the boats were damaged or destroyed.

Two of our aircraft were lost, two of our aircraft were damaged, all others have been recovered safely on the carriers. The destroyers MADDOX and TURNER JOY, which have been operating on routine patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin, have resumed their patrol operations in international waters.

Last night I announced that moves were underway to reinforce our forces in the Pacific area. These moves include the following actions: First, an attack carrier group has been transferred from the First Fleet on the Pacific Coast to the Western Pacific. Secondly, interceptor and fighter bomber aircraft have been moved into South Viet Nam. Thirdly, fighter bomber aircraft have been moved into Thailand. Fourthly, interceptor and fighter bomber squadrons have been transferred from the United States into advance bases in the Pacific. Fifthly, antisubmarine task force group has been moved into the South China Sea. And finally, selected Army and Marine forces have been alerted and readied for movement.

I want to emphasize that the damage report which I gave to you is based on preliminary reports received shortly after the completion of operations.

Now I will take your questions and endeavor to answer them.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, were the planes that we lost, the two planes, downed by ground fire, and also, was there any air action from North Viet Nam?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: The two planes we lost were downed by antiaircraft fire. There was no enemy air reaction.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us the height of the attack? How low did they come?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Generally, the strikes were at low level.

QUESTION: And the local times, Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: The local times ranged from on the order of Noon to 4:00 or 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

QUESTION: Can you tell us, sir, how long the attack --

SECRETARY McNAMARA: These are local Vietnamese times.

QUESTION: Can you tell us how long the entire strike lasted?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Roughly four to five hours.

QUESTION: How was the weather?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Bad.

QUESTION: Rainy?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Low ceiling.

QUESTION: What types of antiaircraft fire?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: There was heavy antiaircraft fire over several of the targets.

QUESTION: Missiles?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Guns rather than missiles.

QUESTION: Small caliber or big caliber?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: I can't tell you the caliber other than it was heavy antiaircraft bases.

QUESTION: Can you tell us at which of these places the planes were downed?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No, I can't.

QUESTION: What was the question?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: The question was at which point were the two aircraft lost. I can simply say that the heaviest antiaircraft fire was received at Hon Gay, the most northerly of the bases attacked.

QUESTION: Is that also the largest?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: It is the largest; yes.

QUESTION: At the torpedo bases themselves, can you describe the damage itself as light or heavy?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: It is too early to say. We will have to wait until the pilots' reports have been assessed.

QUESTION: And the number of American casualties?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Two. Two pilots were lost, one in each of the two downed aircraft.

QUESTION: Are you giving out their names?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Not until their nearest of kin have been notified.

QUESTION: That will be sometime today?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Yes, it will.

QUESTION: Were they picked up?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: We believe they were lost.

QUESTION: At sea or land?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: At sea.

QUESTION: Will we take reconnaissance missions over there?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: We will take such action as is necessary to determine the results of our operations.

QUESTION: How much of the petroleum supply did you say?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Approximately 10 percent of the petroleum capacity of North Viet Nam is located at Vinh, the point that was struck. Approximately 90 percent of that 10 percent was destroyed.

QUESTION: Are these the only four torpedo boat bases?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: These four are the main bases. With a coastline such as this, of course, the boats occasionally use other areas for staging areas.

QUESTION: Can you tell us what percentage it is of their total fleet?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No, I can't, except that it is a very substantial percentage.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, how do you explain these attacks?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: I can't explain them. They were unprovoked. As I told you last night, our vessels were clearly in international waters. Our vessels, when attacked, were operating in this area, roughly 60 miles off of the North Vietnamese coast.

QUESTION: There have been reports that South Vietnamese vessels were showing or taking some sort of action against North Viet Nam approximately at this time.

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No, to the best of my knowledge, there were no operations during the period I was describing last night.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what orders now for either the Seventh Fleet or for these particular units of the Seventh Fleet?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Our orders to the commanders are to continue their patrols, to protect themselves against aggression on the high seas with whatever force is necessary.

QUESTION: Has there been any word --

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, would you say this will be all that will be necessary, that the attack has met its objectives?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Whether this is all that is necessary depends entirely on the North Vietnamese.

QUESTION: Do you think the air strike accomplished its objectives?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: The air strike very clearly made clear to the North Vietnamese our intention to maintain our right to operate on the high seas. That was the objective. I think that has been accomplished.

QUESTION: Wasn't the objective to wipe out the PT boat fleet?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Our objective was to deter the PT boat fleet from further attacks on our vessels. I believe we have accomplished that.

QUESTION: Were any attempts made, Mr. Secretary, to go after the antiaircraft batteries?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: There were no actions against the anti-aircraft batteries. The attack was against the patrol boat bases and the associated facilities.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, last night there were three bogies reported, three unidentified aircraft. Did we ever find out in which direction they came from?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: We have no identification on those aircraft. They did not participate in the attacks on our vessels.

QUESTION: Sir, are there villages or towns adjacent to or linked up with these bases?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: There were no civilian centers close to the bases which were attacked last night.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you give us the estimate of how many percent of the North Vietnamese patrol boat fleet has been destroyed or damaged?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No, I can't estimate for you the exact percent destroyed or damaged, other than to say that it was a very substantial percentage of their fleet.

One more question.

QUESTION: From what you say, there are no further actions of this kind going on at the moment, or planned. Is that correct?

SECRETARY McNAMARA: No operations are being carried on by our forces at the present time, other than the continuation of the routine patrol activities of the TURNER JOY and the MADDOX, the two destroyers which have been operating in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Thank you very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

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NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301

PLEASE NOTE DATE

No. 575-64

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FOR THE PRESS:

August 5, 1964

65

The following is the text of a statement made by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara at a news conference at 9:00 a. m., Wednesday, August 5, 1964:

"As you know on August 2 and again on August 4, North Vietnamese surface vessels attacked U. S. destroyers operating on routine patrol in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin. In retaliation for this unprovoked aggression on the high seas, our forces have struck the bases used by North Vietnamese naval craft.

"During the night, 64 attack sorties were launched from the aircraft carriers TICONDEROGA and CONSTELLATION against 4 North Vietnamese patrol boat bases and an oil storage depot supporting these bases.

"The oil storage depot containing 14 tanks and representing 10% of the petroleum storage capacity of the country was 90% destroyed. Smoke was observed rising to 14,000 feet.

"In addition to damage to the bases and to their support facilities, approximately 25 patrol boats were damaged or destroyed.

"Two of our aircraft were lost and two were damaged; all others have been recovered safely.

"The destroyers MADDOX and C. TURNER JOY are continuing their patrol in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin.

"Last night I stated moves were underway to reinforce our forces in the Pacific area. These moves include:

a. Transfer of an attack carrier group from the First Fleet to the Western Pacific.

b. Movement of interceptor and fighter bomber aircraft into South Vietnam.

MORE

- c. Movement of fighter bomber aircraft into Thailand.
- d. Transfer of interceptor and fighter bomber squadrons from the U. S. to advance bases in the Pacific.
- e. Movement of an anti-submarine task force into the South China Sea.
- f. The alerting and readying for movement of selected Army and Marine forces."

END

MORE

NEWS CONFERENCE

OF

HONORABLE ROBERT S. McNAMARA
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

* * * * *

THE PENTAGON

* * * * *

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 5, 1964

12:02 A.M.

SECRETARY McNAMARA: Earlier tonight the President told the nation the United States would take appropriate action to respond to the unprovoked attacks on U S naval vessels by torpedo boats of North Vietnam. I can tell you that some of that action has already taken place. U S naval aircraft from the carriers TICONDEROGA and CONSTELLATION, these carriers operating in the Gulf of Tonkin where our destroyers had undergone two deliberate attacks in international waters, have already conducted air strikes against the North Vietnamese bases from which these PT boats have operated. Our naval aircraft have also conducted strikes against certain other targets which have directly supported the operation of the PT boats. Furthermore, in view of the unprovoked attacks, the deliberate attacks in international waters on U S naval forces, the United States has taken the precaution of moving substantial military reinforcements to Southeast Asia from our Pacific bases.

In addition we are also sending reinforcements to the Western Pacific from bases in the United States. I think you can understand it is not wise at the present time for me to identify these forces or to list the detailed strength of these movements, but I can assure you that the movements are appropriate to the provocation.

Now I would like to review briefly in chronological order of the unprovoked attacks which took place today, August 4th, on our vessels operating in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin.

You will recall that the destroyer MADDOX operating in those waters on Sunday, was attacked by three PT boats. The President instructed us to add the destroyer TURNER JOY to the patrol being carried out by the MADDOX, and since that time the two vessels have operated on patrol in those waters. You'll see their course on this map.

Here is the southern portion of China, the coast of North Vietnam, down to the 17th parallel, below which, of course, is South Vietnam. This is Hainan Island, possessed by Communist China. The course of our destroyers is here, operating 30, 40 to 60 miles off the coast of North Vietnam in international water, moving southward.

MORE

At 7:40 P.M., August 4th, 7:40 P.M. local time, Vietnamese time, August 4th, the MADDOX at about this position (indicating) reported radar contact with unidentified surface vessels who were paralleling its course, paralleling the track of both the TURNER JOY and the MADDOX.

At 8:36 P.M., by which time it was about in this position (indicating) the MADDOX established two new radar contacts with two unidentified surface vessels and three unidentified aircraft. At this time U. S. fighter aircraft were launched from the carrier TICONDEROGA, which was also operating in the Gulf of Tonkin. These fighter aircraft were launched to rendezvous with the MADDOX and TURNER JOY, and provide air cover to them.

At 9:08, by which time the MADDOX and JOY had advanced south to approximately this point (indicating), the unidentified aircraft had disappeared from the destroyers' radar screens and the surface vessels were remaining at a distance. By that time, the aircraft from the USS TICONDEROGA had arrived over the destroyers and they commenced defensive patrol over them.

By 9:30, the destroyers were at this point (indicating) and at this time the initial attack occurred. Additional vessels had by now appeared on the MADDOX's radar screen, and these vessels were observed to close very rapidly on the destroyers at speeds in excess of 40 knots. The attacking surface vessels continued to close rapidly from both the west and the south.

By 9:52, the MADDOX and the TURNER JOY had continued south to approximately this point (indicating), and they reported they were under continuous torpedo attack and were engaged in defensive counterfire.

By 10:15 they had advanced approximately to here (indicating). They were reporting they were avoiding torpedoes and that they had sunk one of the attacking patrol craft.

At 10:42, the destroyers reported they had evaded additional torpedoes and had sunk a second of the attacking patrol craft. Other aircraft from the TICONDEROGA had arrived overhead and joined the defensive patrol.

At 10:52 the MADDOX reported the destroyers were again under attack. At midnight, by which time the vessels were in this position (indicating).

MORE

the destroyers reported they had suffered no hits, no casualties, and that the defense aircraft from the TICONDEROGA were illuminating the area and attacking the enemy surface craft.

At 12:32, at which time they were at this point (indicating) the patrol reported that an additional enemy craft was believed to have been sunk, and that low ceilings, poor weather, was beginning to hamper the aircraft operations.

At 12:54, the TURNER JOY, one of the two destroyers, reported that during the engagement, in addition to the torpedo attacks, the destroyer had been fired upon by automatic weapons while being illuminated by search lights.

At 1:30 a.m., by which time the destroyers were in this position (indicating) they reported the attacking craft had apparently broken off the engagement. The MADDOX and TURNER JOY were directed to resume their normal and routine patrol operations, and they are continuing them at the present time.

Now, I will endeavor to answer your questions.

QUESTION: Sir, was there anything else ever seen or heard from the unidentified aircraft?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: No. The unidentified aircraft did not participate in the attack and at this moment, we have no further information regarding them.

QUESTION: In which direction did they disappear?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: I can't tell you. There was no further information on them.

QUESTION: Can you name the bases in North Viet Nam that were attacked?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: No. I cannot.

QUESTION: Will you name them before the Communists do?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: We will name them at a time appropriate to the safety of our forces. It would be inappropriate to name them at this time. The attack is continuing at present.

QUESTION: Can you tell us how many bases?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: No. Until such time as the attack is completed, it would be unwise to comment further or to identify the areas being attacked.

QUESTION: Can you tell us if the attack is currently underway?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: It is currently underway.

QUESTION: You made a distinction between North Viet Nam and certain other support facilities?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: I simply wanted to distinguish between patrol craft bases themselves and certain supporting installations which might be separated geographically from the mooring points of the craft but in North Viet Nam.

QUESTION: There is no question that we attacked any other place but North Viet Nam?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: None whatsoever.

QUESTION: Can you say if we are attacking Hanoi?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: We are not attacking Hanoi. We are attacking only the patrol craft bases and certain associated logistical facilities.

QUESTION: In that area?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: Not in the area of Hanoi. But in North Viet Nam.

QUESTION: The same area as the patrol craft?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: In the same area as the patrol craft are moored but separated physically from the mooring point.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us when the attack has been completed, what orders the entire group has in this area?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: We will only be able to tell you such information as will not reveal future plans or in any way jeopardize our future operations.

QUESTION: What I mean is, will they go back to the standing orders which they had?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: It will depend on circumstances at the time.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, has the alert status of the United States forces around the world been increased?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: Only such units are are being alerted for reinforcing moves.

QUESTION: Has there been any long range alerts to any portion of defense industrial base at all?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: No, none.

QUESTION: Sir, were all the attacks from the two carriers?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: Yes. The only aircraft participating in the strikes are aircraft from the TICONDEROGA and the CONSTELLATION.

QUESTION: You, I think, said that the carriers were in the Gulf of Tonkin?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: Yes.

QUESTION: They have moved up. They are shown as being outside.

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: The TICONDEROGA is essentially in the Gulf area and the CONSTELLATION has been moving in this direction.

QUESTION: Sir, will this be one strike or several strikes?

MORE

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: There are obviously more than one aircraft from each carrier participating in it, but it is basically one strike, unless there are further unprovoked attacks on our vessels.

QUESTION: This is just a retaliatory strike, then?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: I simply want to leave it as I said it.

QUESTION: Can you describe the weapons or type of aircraft being used?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: No, they are typical aircraft from attack carriers.

QUESTION: Do you know whether the strike has been successful at all?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: I am sure it will be successful.

QUESTION: Can you tell us whether they have encountered any aircraft opposition or any interdiction by air?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: The strikes are continuing so I can't give you any progress report on it.

QUESTION: How many aircraft are involved on our part?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: The aircraft from two attack carriers.

QUESTION: No numbers?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: I can't give you any more information.

QUESTION: The presumption is conventional weapons.

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: Yes. Not only presumption, but that is the fact.

QUESTION: What did CIC radar show the course of the three unidentified aircraft to be from? Hainan?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: We don't have any report on the course of the aircraft.

QUESTION: How many casualty reports on the strikes?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: There have been none so far. There have been no casualties so far.

QUESTION: What time was the strike launched?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: I prefer not to give you the exact time of launch.

QUESTION: Were the aircraft from the CONSTELLATION involved in the operation of the MADDOX and JOY?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: Yes. This is a question I should clarify for you. I may not have made it clear. The question is were aircraft from the CONSTELLATION involved in the protective cover during the attacks on the two destroyers August 4th, and the answer is yes. The CONSTELLATION and the TICONDEROGA alternated in providing air cap for the destroyers on the 4th.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I am sure there is no doubt in your mind that these PT boats came from, in fact, North Vietnam?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: There is none. The radar made it quite clear that they were coming from North Vietnamese bases.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us the distance over which this engagement occurred? Is it about 60 or 65 miles?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: These are about 60 miles square (indicating) so you can see during this period of time from 7:40 when there was an indication that an attack was imminent, until some time around midnight, to 1:30, when it terminated, they covered a distance of something on the order of 80 miles.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you give us the basic reasons for the Gulf of Tonkin patrol?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: It is a routine patrol of the type we carry out in international waters all over the world.

QUESTION: Does it have anything to do with movements of junks or whatever it is back and forth?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: No. It has no special relationship to any operations in that area. We are carrying routine patrols of this kind on all over the world all the time.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you have any idea why the North Vietnamese may have done this?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: None.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that the destroyer

at one point was under attack by automatic weapons. Does that mean both destroyers, or just the MADDOX?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: The report was, I believe, that both destroyers had been attacked by automatic weapons.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, have we picked up any survivors?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: No, we have picked up no survivors on either the second or the fourth.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the reinforcements moving from the Western Pacific and the Coast, are they of all services?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: Yes.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, has SAC and Air Defense Command been placed on an increased alert?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: No, it has not.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us when this attack, this strike, may be over, or when we may expect further details?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: I would think that you might expect some further details tomorrow morning.

QUESTION: Have there been any casualties, any damage, anything whatsoever with American Forces?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: There have been no casualties to American forces, either sea or air, and no damage to American forces to date, either sea or air.

QUESTION: That includes the current air strike?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: Yes, but as I point out, the current air strikes are not completed yet.

QUESTION: Has there been opposition?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: I cannot report on that until we get the full mission report which we don't have at the present time.

QUESTION: What is the closest, roughly, that the attacking craft have come to the MADDOX and JOY?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: We have had reports of torpedoes 100 and 200 yards off the beam of the ships. I can't tell you how close the attacking craft came to the vessels, although if they were

firing automatic weapons they must have been closer than 800 yards at a minimum.

QUESTION: Who opened fire first?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: It was quite clear that the PT boats initiated the attack.

QUESTION: When was the last time that there were destroyers up there in the Tonkin Gulf?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: I prefer not to answer the question other than to say that we have been carrying on routine patrols in that area for months.

QUESTION: How far up do you go, Mr. Secretary, before they turn back?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: I prefer not to answer that, either. We don't wish to identify the course of our operations in the area.

QUESTION: Can you tell us what order the strike aircraft have, if they encounter interceptor aircraft in North Vietnam?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: They are to destroy any aircraft that are in a position to attack them.

QUESTION: Do we have --

QUESTION: One the ground?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: In the air.

QUESTION: We have troops from the Far East Asia to -- well, does that mean ground forces are being put into South Vietnam?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: No, it means we are reinforcing our forces with such additional forces we believe to be required and have placed on alert such forces as we believe to be necessary.

I don't wish to identify the types or numbers or names or locations of those forces.

QUESTION: Can you repeat that first part about no troops in Vietnam?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: The question was: Have additional troops been moved into North Vietnam, meaning have combat units been moved into North Vietnam -- I meant South Vietnam -- and the answer is no

QUESTION: Are we hitting only shore installations, or do we move inland?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: I referred to patrol craft bases and supporting logistical installations in close proximity to but geographically separate from.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, have there been any similar aggressive actions on the part of the North Vietnamese navy short of the torpedoing that we didn't bother to report before?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: No.

QUESTION: This was the first time?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: That is right. I want to emphasize that these attacks both on Sunday and today, both on the second of August and the fourth of August, occurred in international waters. These destroyers were operating between 30 and 60 miles off the North Vietnamese coast.

QUESTION: Can you tell us what towns, cities, or whatever on the Vietnamese coast are roughly closest or parallel to the area of attack?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: No.

QUESTION: Not our attack but theirs on us.

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: No.

QUESTION: How far off was the 7:40 P.M.? Was that 60 miles?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: These squares are 60 miles, so this point is on the order of 65 miles, perhaps. As you can see down here, it is something a little less than that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, some of our readers will find it difficult to understand how the two destroyers were chased, and apparently from this maneuver they made, they ran from these PT boats and yet they were sufficiently --

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: No, this is their course of patrol (indicating).

QUESTION: While under attack?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: Yes, they were proceeding south.

QUESTION: Once they were engaged they didn't turn?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: No. This is the approximate direction they moved in (indicating). Of course, they were taking evasive action during that period of time to avoid the torpedoes which were launched against them.

QUESTION: But if they were sufficiently close to be illuminated by the PT boats, the question a reader will have is how come the destroyers weren't able to nullify the PT boats.

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: They did. They sunk at least two.

QUESTION: Two out of how many, sir?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: We can't be sure. It was a night attack. We can't be certain of the total number of boats that were engaged. I will give you an estimate, just for your own information, although I can't be absolutely certain of these numbers. I would say between three and six boats were engaged in the attack, of which at least two were sunk.

MORE

QUESTION: How did you know that?

QUESTION: And in which they were engaged for a period of, I believe, two hours?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: Yes.

QUESTION: How did you know they were sunk, those two?

QUESTION: Were these sunk by destroyer fire or aircraft fire?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: I can't identify the source of the sinking.

QUESTION: Did you use the five inch and three inch batteries? Is that all?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: The five inch batteries plus certain automatic weapons available on the destroyers were used.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the earlier statement put out said they were believed to have been sunk. Is this later information they have been sunk?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: It has been reported to us that they were sunk. This, let me emphasize, was a night action. You must expect certain restrictions in the amount of information available under night conditions. But the report to us from sources that we believe are reliable indicates that at least two vessels were sunk.

QUESTION: Sir, are you confident that one PT boat was sunk on Sunday?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: Yes, that is correct.

QUESTION: But is this later information that makes it more likely that they were sunk?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: Just five minutes before I came down, I received a report that they were sunk.

QUESTION: In other words, the later information is flat?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: I just want to repeat what I said, that the report was that two PT boats at least were sunk, and a possible third. That is right.

QUESTION: Can you tell us at all whether any of the damage was inflicted by five inch guns?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: No. This was night time. I can't identify the type of shell that caused the damage, or even the source of the damage as between destroyers on the one hand, and our aircraft on the other.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you give us a rundown on the remaining portion of the North Vietnamese Navy? Jane's Fighting Ships says they have a total of 16 PT boats, of which I figure you have sunk now one fifth.

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: I don't wish to give you our estimate of the number of North Vietnamese boats by type, for obvious reasons, but I will tell you there are two different types. One type we identify as the PT-4's. This is a patrol craft with a speed of approximately 50 knots. The other type we identify as the Swatow type, a patrol craft with a lesser speed, approximating 40 knots. We believe that both types of patrol craft were engaged in today's operation.

QUESTION: How do you spell Swatow?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: S-w-a-t-o-w.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, approximately how many hostile torpedoes were fired at our ships?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: It is very difficult to estimate. I don't wish to make a guess at them.

QUESTION: How many do they carry, sir?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: I don't wish to approximate that, either.

QUESTION: Has your government been in touch during today or since Sunday with the Government of the Soviet Union on those incidents?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: I would rather not discuss that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary --

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: One more question.

QUESTION: I have three sunk in my notes.

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: One sunk on Sunday, at least two sunk today, possibly a third sunk today, for a total of possibly four, as a possible.

QUESTION: And the last one is a possible.

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: The possible third one today which would make a four possible in total.

QUESTION: Did you say the nearest torpedoes were about 200 yards away?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: Torpedoes were reported as passing between 100 and 200 yards abeam of the ships. One more question.

QUESTION: Can you set something up for tomorrow?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: I will see that you are provided with whatever news we can properly release. I will either do it myself or arrange for others to do it.

QUESTION: How about tonight?

SECRETARY MC NAMARA: I don't believe there will be anything tonight. I will be receiving reports. I am going to stay in the building tonight and receive reports every half hour from CINCPAC. But I doubt that there will be anything to release tonight.

THE PRESS: Thank you, sir.

End--12:30 A.m.



NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301

PLEASE NOTE DATE

FOR THE PRESS:

August 4, 1964

NO. 571-64
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The following is the text of the statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara at a news conference Tuesday evening, August 4, 1964:

The President told the nation earlier tonight that the United States would take appropriate action in view of the unprovoked attacks in international waters on U. S. naval vessels by torpedo boats belonging to North Vietnam.

I can tell you some of the action that has already been undertaken. U. S. Naval aircraft from the Carriers TICONDEROGA and CONSTELLATION in the Bay of Tonkin area where our destroyers have undergone two deliberate attacks by the North Vietnamese have already initiated air strikes against the bases from which these PT boats have operated. Our naval aircraft have conducted strikes against certain other targets directly supporting the operation of the PT boats.

Again, in view of the unprovoked and deliberate attacks in international waters on U. S. naval vessels, the United States has taken the precaution of moving substantial military reinforcements to Southeast Asia. It is also making replacement deployments to the Western Pacific from the Continental United States.

It is not wise at the moment to identify or give the detailed strength of these movements, but I can assure you that they are appropriate to the provocation.

I would like to review, in chronological order, the two unprovoked attacks on our vessels as they were initiated by the North Vietnamese, not only on Sunday, August 2, but again today, Tuesday, August 4.

MORE

CHRONOLOGY OF FIRST ATTACK

(All times are local times at destroyer's position)

10:00 A.M., August 2

MADDOX reported observing an estimated 75 junks near her assigned patrol area off the North Vietnam coast. She reported changing her course in order to avoid the junk concentration.

12:30 P.M., August 2

MADDOX reported that three torpedo boats were on a southerly course heading toward the ship at extreme range (over 10 miles). The MADDOX at this point was about 30 miles from the coast.

2:40 P.M., August 2

MADDOX reported she was being approached by the high speed (estimated 45 to 50 knots) craft whose apparent intention was to conduct a torpedo attack and that she intended to open fire in self-defense if necessary.

3:08 P.M., August 2

MADDOX reported she was being attacked by the three PT craft. She opened fire with her five-inch battery after three warning shots failed to slow down the attackers.

3:08 P.M., August 2

The PT's continued their closing maneuvers and two of the PT's closed to 5,000 yards, each firing one torpedo. The MADDOX changed course in an evasive move and the two torpedoes passed close aboard on the starboard side (100 to 200 yards).

USS TICONDEROGA (CVA-14) advised she was sending four already airborne F-8E;s (CRUSADERS) with rockets and 20mm. ammunition to provide air cover for MADDOX.

3:21 P.M., August 2

The third PT moved up to the beam of the MADDOX and received a direct hit by a five-inch round, and at the same time dropped a torpedo into the water which was not seen to run. Machine gun fire from the PT's was directed at the MADDOX. However, there was no damage or injury to personnel. The MADDOX continued in a southerly direction to join with

the C. TURNER JOY (DD-951) as TICONDEROGA aircraft commenced attacking the PT's. ZUNI rocket runs and 20mm strafing attacks were directed against two of the PT's and they were damaged. The third PT remained dead in the water after the direct hit by the MADDOX. At 3:29 P.M., the aircraft broke off the engagement and escorted the MADDOX towards South Vietnam waters.

The C. TURNER JOY joined with the MADDOX and continued patrols in the area in international waters with carrier aircraft providing protective coverage.

3 August 1967

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3 August 1967

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OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301

PLEASE NOTE DATE

FOR THE PRESS: August 4, 1964

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68

The following statement was issued today by Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Sylvester:

"A second deliberate attack was made during darkness by an undetermined number of North Vietnamese PT boats on the USS MADDOX and USS C. TURNER JOY while the two destroyers were cruising in company on routine patrol in the Tonkin Gulf in international waters about 65 miles from the nearest land. The attack came at 10:30 P.M. local time (10:30 A.M., August 4, Washington time.)

"The PT boats were taken under fire by the destroyers and thereafter by attack aircraft from the TICONDEROGA and the CONSTELLATION.

"The attackers were driven off with no U.S. casualties, no hits and no damage to either destroyer.

"It is believed that at least two of the PT boats were sunk and two others damaged."

END

ARC/c

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PRESS BRIEFING

with

HON. ARTHUR SYLVESTER,
Assistant Defense Secretary (Public Affairs)

and

ADMIRAL MACK,
Navy Chief of Information

and

MR. WALTER CARLSON,
Director, Technical Information Agency

at the

PENTAGON BUILDING
Washington, D. C.

on

TUESDAY, AUGUST 4, 1964

from

1203 to 1233 Hours

SECRETARY SYLVESTER: As you know we've tried to handle all the possible questions that we can on the Maddox incident and the chronology yesterday was an attempt to be helpful. We still don't have all the details but we still have Admiral Mack, who, as you know, is Navy Chief of Information. And he's agreed to come here and fill you in on what additional information he has.

Admiral Mack, would you be kind enough to take over.

ADMIRAL MACK: The Maddox is still up where it's difficult to indicate where we might call routine things, so what we have is small bits of information which we did get from her and I'd be glad to anything you want on the possible maneuvers she might have made (inaudible) fire of her guns or fire control set-up and so forth.

Now we do know this, that she fired 151 rounds of 5-inch, 132 rounds of 3-inch, and she said she saw numerous hits on each of the three PTs. The aircraft fired a total between the four of them of (inaudible), and they reported two possible hits.

The four aircraft fired a total of 800 20 mm aircraft machine gun rounds and reported 2 to 5 hits on each of the three boats.

PRESS: Was that each of them?

ADMIRAL MACK: On each of the three.

I say this is as much hard information as we have.

I'll be glad to go into any of the rumors that I can reconstruct

as far as we know. It's rather sketchy still.

PRESS: Can you tell us about where this Maddox and Joy are now?

You say they're up in the Tonkin Gulf.

ADMIRAL MACK: It would not be wrong to tell you exactly what spot they're in now, but we do^{not}/ even know.

PRESS: In other words, it was indicated that the Maddox was on its way out from a patrol out further in the Gulf. And it was coming down almost--now to the--is it going back in now or is it still in the lower area?

ADMIRAL MACK: It never left. It's been in the area all the time.

PRESS: Are we going to keep something up there for (inaudible) up there then on continuous--ly?

ADMIRAL MACK: This would ve a very hard policy. I couldn't say that except what I can gather from the President's remarks and other remarks made--we'll keep it up there as long we feel we need it.

PRESS: Did the Maddox call for aircraft at the first sight of the PT boats some two hours before the engagement?

ADMIRAL MACK: No, the first sighting was just passing or on regular patrol, when she saw that there were PT boats in the general area. She called for the aircraft when these 3 PTs began to come toward her and she realized they were coming in at high speed.

PRESS: These two possible hits on the 8 shots was pretty good hits for the Zaney Robinson?

ADMIRAL MACK: Well, Zaney was designed primarily for shore support, in other words a fixed target or maybe a slow-moving target, or something of this sort. Now he fired Zaney (?) at roughly two miles slant range and the PT boat making 42 knots, so in the time of tire the Zaney she would make 138 yards and this means that in that 6-second time of flight, the Zaney coming down, she could change course enough to make the Zaney miss by (inaudible) over their shoulder and would do this. The Zaney is not really designed to hit a PT boat; that's not what it was for. They were using it because they had--when they were up there on patrol they were sent up to do most anything that came along so it so happened that the first job that (inaudible) was PT destruction and they weren't necessarily armed exactly for that. They were up there for most anything, combat air patrol, against aircraft, shore installations or shipping, anything that came along.

PRESS: Explain now, what is the mission of the Maddox?

ADMIRAL MACK: She is up there to gather information on shipping (inaudible), conduct surveillance of the whole area to see what's going on and in international waters has a right to be in there.

PRESS: Were any casualties and/or prisoners picked up?

ADMIRAL MACK: No.

PRESS: It's still not clear whether the guys in the PT boat could have mistaken the Maddox for a South Vietnamese ship?

ADMIRAL MACK: I'd say the answer there is no. The seas were calm so there wasn't much freight around the bow of the Maddox. Visibility was very good. She's got three great big numbers on the bow and the South Vietnamese have no ships which look anything like this, nor do they have big numbers on the bow.

PRESS: Well, now, you say--as I understand it from the chronology of the PT boats went after the Maddox at about 5,000 yards.

ADMIRAL MACK: Well, visibility was at 10 miles so--

PRESS: Well, 10 miles. At 10 miles the PT boats wouldn't know what they were coming at, would they?

ADMIRAL MACK: No, but they'd know when they got in at--

PRESS: At what point would they know what they really were heading for?

ADMIRAL MACK: Six miles.

They would have seen the numbers and they would have known this was not a South Vietnamese ship, at 6 or 7 miles.

PRESS: They would know at 6 or 7 miles that it was not a South Vietnamese ship.

Had they been fired on by that time?

ADMIRAL MACK: No, they were not fired on until inside

that range, 4-1/2 miles.

PRESS: They don't have anything anywhere near as big, did they?

ADMIRAL MACK: Nothing like it in size, shape, or silhouette.

PRESS: Well, I was told that on the radar a destroyer and an ICG, for example, will look about the same.

ADMIRAL MACK: They would jack, but this was good visibility and without heavy seas you could see the bow and there's no reason they couldn't see where, as they wouldn't have spray (inaudible)--

PRESS: Also they (inaudible) fire burst (inaudible).

ADMIRAL MACK: Well, they, we'll say, made an attack for instance--attack would seem to be when you take three boats and in what you'd call attack formation and approach another ship at high speed up on her bow or up on her beam where you can fire a torpedo from and if you are not flying a flag of your country and another country and you keep on coming at high speed in this same direction, that constitutes an attack.

PRESS: In other words, (inaudible)

PRESS: Admiral, did the Captain of the Maddox need any additional instructions from anybody's superior to him or its up to the Captain who was aboard to take action?

ADMIRAL MACK: No, under what he was doing at the time, he felt, I think, he had sufficient instructions.

PRESS: His rule of engagement covered whatever needed to be covered?

ADMIRAL MACK: Yes.

PRESS: Was the Maddox flying its colors?

ADMIRAL MACK: I don't know, but my guess would be yes. They always do, in those waters. I can't confirm it but the custom is to do it anywhere that you're in where you might be confused with anybody else.

PRESS: Could you tell us what happened between 1:30 and 3:40?

ADMIRAL MACK: Only in a general way, Charlie. They were patrolling. They were going into a--you talk about the hours of attack?

PRESS: Yes.

ADMIRAL MACK: Well,---

PRESS: They'd be the 2 hours and 20 minutes gap in your chronology, before the attack.

ADMIRAL MACK: I don't have the--

PRESS: Before the attack but after the--I think at 1:30 the PTs were at, what's he describe as extreme range--but at 3:40 you were brought under attack.

ADMIRAL MACK: The PTs were cited at one time here (indicating). I can't tell you what the Maddox was doing, whether she went up this way and came back or whether she went down this way-and went up (indicating), but at one time they were PTs seen

here (indicating). Whether they were the same PTs that attacked here or not is not known. But all that is known is that the PTs that did attack came from this general direction. They could have come up here and then down, or they might have come from some other area. It is not known what happened.

PRESS: They could have done all that after you first saw them, after one (inaudible)?

ADMIRAL MACK: That's right. 40 miles of the (inaudible) 20 knots or so that's 2 hours.

PRESS: Between the--during those two hours I take it the only surveillance of those two PT boats was by the radar of the Maddox, is that correct?

ADMIRAL MACK: Yes.

PRESS: There was no aircraft set out from the Ticondaronda (?) to let you know--

ADMIRAL MACK: That's correct. There was no indication at that time that they would take any hostile action.

PRESS: Where's the Ticonderonda?

ADMIRAL MACK: At present? I can't tell you that, except that if you run back the 30 minutes or so that it took the aircraft to get there it must be somewhere (inaudible--noise). I can't--

PRESS: Well, I was trying to--would she be in the Gulf or would she be out (inaudible)?

ADMIRAL MACK: Well, I can't tell you that. I was

if I was skipper of the Ticonderoga, I'd be somewhere around in here (indicating).

PRESS: You'd be below the 17th parallel?

ADMIRAL MACK: Not just because (inaudible) because I'd have to be where you'd go to Laos; if you go any faster then (inaudible).

PRESS: I see.

ADMIRAL MACK: And if you were in a position to make (inaudible)--

PRESS: Under the orders that have been issued now, had this attack not occurred, what would have been the orders?

ADMIRAL MACK: All I know about it, is that to destroy would be--presented me with the same (inaudible) and only the attack would have been scorched and the PT boats destroyed.

PRESS: In brief is that the only change in orders?

ADMIRAL MACK: No, I would prejudice the commanding officer by--if I were to say what he would do now and what he did then because we don't know exactly what he did and other things we don't know, such as the aircraft (inaudible) when this all started; they got up there and it took 30 minutes to get there and stayed as long as their gasoline would permit them to go, they had additional rounds, but it was in doubt if (inaudible) use it. But the present rules that there be a (inaudible) over the ship, therefore the aircraft would have time to make attacks. We don't know exactly what the Maddox did, at that time. All

we--pretty well know from reading instructions is you know what she would do in the future. But we don't know what she did--

PRESS: Did the Maddox, as I understand it, detach from any of the group so far (inaudible)?

ADMIRAL MACK: No, she's part of the 7th Fleet.

PRESS: She's part of the 7th Fleet but she's not part of any group or task force or something, is she, such as--

ADMIRAL MACK: At the moment she was not necessarily part of the Ticonderoga group. The Ticonderoga is a carrier (inaudible--noises) patrol.

PRESS: At the time of the attack did the captain of the Maddox have orders issued to kill if he were attacked the way presumably he would have today?

ADMIRAL MACK: Well, it depends upon whether the attack is pressed: He certainly would have a right under the old instructions to defend himself including doingg anything you want, including sinking of PTs and so forth.

PRESS: (inaudible) turn and run.

ADMIRAL MACK: We would not interpret he was turning and running when he did what he did. He was headed south anyway and one of the defense he has in a PT attack is to get as much speed as you can so she can maneuver and there's only one place you could head and except to head toward North Viet-nam.

PRESS: He had three crippled PT boats all three of presum--have been hit according to the reports. The question is

why didn't he go after them and destroy them?

ADMIRAL MACK: We don't know that. We do know that the first two which attacked then turned off and went north. They still had pretty good speed and the third one kept after them and he had to keep on evading that and he did then he left this one dead in the water. Now why he didn't come back and destroy this one we don't know that. But we do know that after this happened he did then send the four aircraft to make attacks on all three of these PTs, and the reason they left was not because they weren't pursuing but because they didn't have enough gasoline to stay on.

PRESS: Well, would you say that under the prior orders he would be entitled to go back and sink this ship? Obviously this is what is now suggested now, but will you--

ADMIRAL MACK: Look, I can't answer that one, you're getting into policy which is not my area.

PRESS: Well, that (demadible) but under ordinary circumstances if a Naval vessel is attacked I always assumed that they could return fire and sink the aggressor. I thought that was just a sort of normal order of procedure.

ADMIRAL MACK: I think it would be true Jack if you could do it without turning around and chasing him clear up the coast to North Vietnamese waters.

PRESS: Well, all right, now that brings another question: what about this principle of hot pursuit. Is that a normal

principle or is that that you have to get specific instructions on?

ADMIRAL MACK: Well, hot pursuit is part of international law. You can't do anything about hot pursuit as far as the (inaudible) is how far you do it? You go into territorial waters or don't you?

PRESS: But here there was no question of territorial waters.

ADMIRAL MACK: No.

PRESS: It was all international waters.

ADMIRAL MACK: That's right so the principle was not involved here since they didn't go into territorial waters. The reason I'm being evasive in a way is because we don't know exactly how far these PTs were--one indication was they were 10 miles north of the Maddox when the aircraft started the attack and kept on going at 40-some-odd knots even though they had been hit. The Maddox only makes roughly 30, so maybe he figured there was no point in chasing them when he couldn't catch them. We're guessing at what was in his mind and what he did; we don't even know what he did afterwards. We couldn't get in touch with him.

PRESS: There's no plans to bring him back until his tour is completed out there, is that right?

ADMIRAL MACK: I think that's correct. He's going to do what he's set to do and not leave just because what's happened to him.

PRESS: How often do the--how long are these patrols normally, what length of time?

ADMIRAL MACK: Well, they're irregular and I wouldn't want to say how long they are because this would destroy the business of maintaining their irregularity, but--

PRESS: I see.

ADMIRAL MACK: --you can see pretty well to go up into the Gulf very far it would take 4 or 5 days to go up as fast and how many times a month this is done would vary so there wouldn't be regularity to it.

PRESS: But you regularly detach a destroyer to go up into the Gulf, look around and come back and then you send another one up there to look around--

ADMIRAL MACK: Some of the time.

PRESS: --you keep on doing this--

ADMIRAL MACK: Not successfully, no, Jack. You might send one up and not for some time; it depends on whether you think there is something to look for.

PRESS: They don't always have a patrol--

ADMIRAL MACK: Not (inaudible) all the time, no.

PRESS: Was it the intention of yesterday's chronology to say that the Maddox is literally back in the Gulf?

ADMIRAL MACK: That was not the intent but she is in the Gulf and never left. This wasn't put in there.

PRESS: Now, if she never left could you tell us

where the Joy was that--well she was (inaudible) on the incident; they seemed to have linked up pretty quickly. She---

ADMIRAL MACK: She was roughly 100 miles or something of this sort. I don't know exactly. I could find out, but the positions were kind of a distance of 100 miles or more outside the Gulf.

PRESS: They joined up the day of the attack, didn't they?

ADMIRAL MACK: Maybe the next day, Charlie. I don't exactly know. This happened at 4 o'clock and it was over about 5. Whether they go there within the next 7 hours I don't know, but it would have been possible if they wanted to but I don't know.

PRESS: Where would you say the Gulf began and ended at this (inaudible) bottom corner of that map of Hanan cross (inaudible) or the Gulf (inaudible) ADMIRAL MACK: / at the closest point here, this point on the Gulf?

PRESS: L Admiral, can you tell us whether the Constellation left Hong Kong today?

ADMIRAL MACK: No, not exactly. She left a little early for operations to sea.

PRESS: A little early.

PRESS: Did it have any connection with the three motor torpedo boats?

ADMIRAL MACK: I can't say that Charlie. She left for operations at sea and Hong Kong is not too far away.

PRESS: What's the speed of the Joy compared to Maddox?

ADMIRAL MACK: About 2 knots.

PRESS: 2 knots.

SECRETARY LENNARTSON: We have the announcement on the Technical Information being established. We have with us Mr. Walter Carlson, Director of Technical Information (inaudible).

MR. CARLSON: The only comment I care to make is that when we set up this program Secretary Gilpatric set it up about a year and a half ago, we had to establish some priorities as to what we want to work on, and what--you know we went first after the problem of the Armed Services Technical Information Agency and converted it into Defense Documentation Center. We've had--we knew at that time that we had to do something more about information contained in the documents as well as just to get a good document-handling system, and do it on a DOD-wide basis.

We're committed to a policy of decentralized activity, and have made and intend to make only the exception of the Defense Documentation Center and only really central operation in the Department. This instruction carries through our further conviction that we can and can profitably organize technical effort aimed at extracting the useful information from documents and making it available to our various scientists and engineers and their supervision throughout the Defense community.

There's a rather important distinction here between

just handling documents and also handling the meaning or the useful information in the documents, the distinction being mainly that to handle the information you need people who are technically qualified to understand this, sift it, screen it, evaluate it, analyze it, and pass it on to other people. This is not an easy job.

We've had to face some competing alternatives, or competing emotions I might say. It sounds like a very fine idea and the President Science Advisory Committee made a very strong point of it, but also getting on top of and managing this sort of a thing requires extremely close cooperation of a large segment of our technical population, people who are engaged in normal research and development work, taking time out to do this kind of an information function. The 22 that we have certified that are already in operation look to us as though they have committed themselves in sufficient depth, technically and emotionally to perform this sort of a DOD-wide function. We got a lot of others that are in existence today that we're not quite so sure of and of course, I expect this instruction will cause quite a flow of requests to DDI&E for this establishment of some others I know, 8 or 10 already being staffed in the various military departments looking toward being established under the provisions of this instruction.

PRESS: (Inaudible question)

MR. CARLSON: Yes.

PRESS: 8 or 10 in all DOD resources?

MR. CARLSON: No. There are some being considered in research institutes, one or--two that I know of in universities, and about 4 or 5 at DOD laboratories.

PRESS: (Inaudible question)

MR. CARLSON: They're listed here on the back. I would guess--I haven't made an analysis. You can identify whether they're at a Government installation or a university or a research institute. As a matter of fact, I think you'll find two of them in here that are, that might be considered at--three of them-- that might be considered as industrial or operations run for profit. The one at Hughes and the one at Belfor (?). So we're not excluding the industrial sites either.

PRESS: (Inaudible question)

MR. CARLSON: Well, the total of the 22 are budgeted in fiscal 65 at \$7-1/4 million dollars and the 11 more that exist that we haven't really made up our mind on certifying yet, whether to do it or not, is represented by another \$3 million. And my guess is that the 8 or 10 that I know of being in process will represent something in the range of \$4 to \$5 million, in addition to--this will give you some idea of the scale of activity. In the DOD scheme of things this is pretty small money, but let me assure you this represents man-hours of technical people engaged in nothing but information extraction and analysis operation and it better be good people or these things don't work. So these are high-

class personnel requirements.

PRESS: (Inaudible question)

MR. CARLSON: All the people that are doing the information analysis are professional people, and if I had my way they'll be professionals in the field of the center as opposed to being information specialists or something like that.

PRESS: These 8 or 10 that you're talking about are the new breed of (inaudible), they're different than these 22 existing--

MR. CARLSON: On different subjects. For example, you won't find anything on (inaudible) in here; they're are some people putting one together. You won't find anything on command and control. People are looking into fields like that.

PRESS: But you made a distinction in here between the centers which handle documents which were the existing ones desired--

MR. CARLSON: No. These 22 listed here are information analysis centers, according to this definition. And are quite different from the defense documentation center or some of our libraries or organizations like that which simply are document depositories.

PRESS: And in the second paragraph here where you say that the functions are primarily concerned with the handling of documents, you're not referring to the centers there listed?

MR. CARLSON: The ones that are listed are those

distinguished from the document centers.

PRESS: I see.

MR. CARLSON: We're not starting this thing from scratch. We got a going operation. The oldest of these, I guess, has been in operation for about 8 or 9 years. What we're going to do is find out what's good about them and get that written into a broad policy statement through the whole Department.

PRESS: How does this compare with NASA's technical information dissemination program?

MR. CARLSON: NASA has a document center which is run by Documentation, Inc. for them and that relates to our--to DDC. Those two are comparable. NASA does not have any information analysis centers for--of this nature, for their own people. NASA has been generating at Indiana University, and more recently at Wayne State in the future at some other places, some information and activities addressed to the local industry.

And that is quite different from what we're doing here.

PRESS: Is there any reason why NASA shouldn't use these centers?

MR. CARLSON: No, there's no reason why they shouldn't. Charles, the--and indeed NASA even has money in, I believe, two of the 22. We expect that once these things are set up and operated effectively on a DOD-wide basis, we see no reason to have the same subject effort being duplicated in some other Government agency. If they have a need for it, they'll have access to it.

PRESS: So it's so that once they've talked it over, that NASA will participate to the extent that interested in these subject areas?

MR. CARLSON: Indeed, and we have discussions under way with NASA on new subject areas as a matter of fact.

PRESS: I don't understand how personnel will be able to get answers to specific technical questions. Do you have a center whose job it is to search the literature and to know how to get it? Is that the idea?

MR. CARLSON: They will do more than that. They will have done--they will have read it and they will set aside the new information or the good information; they'll have their own opinion as to the value of a new report or a new research finding and you can literally call the man that's done this and if necessary, get over the phone his evaluation of the latest work in the field. He can do it out of his head or by referring to some cards on which he has jotted down notes or what have you.

PRESS: Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 1233 hours the conference was concluded.)

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NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301

PLEASE NOTE DATE

FOR THE PRESS

August 3, 1964

NO. 566-64

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70

The following is a chronology of the incident concerning the USS MADDOX (DD-731) on August 2, 1964:

(All times are Eastern Daylight Time)

11:00 P.M., August 1:

MADDOX reported observing an estimated 75 junks near her assigned patrol area off the North Viet Nam coast. She reported changing her course in order to avoid the junk concentration and indicated that there was no evidence of any hostility.

1:30 A.M., August 2:

MADDOX reported that three torpedo boats were on a southerly course heading toward the ship at extreme range (over 10 miles). The MADDOX at this point was about 30 miles from the coast.

3:40 A.M., August 2:

MADDOX reported she was being approached by the high speed (estimated 45 to 50 knots) craft whose apparent intention was to conduct a torpedo attack and that she intended to open fire in self-defense if necessary.

4:08 A.M., August 2:

MADDOX reported she was being attacked by the three PT craft. She opened fire with her five-inch battery after three warning shots failed to slow down the attackers.

4:08 A.M., August 2:

The PT's continued their closing maneuvers and two of the PT's closed to 5,000 yards, each firing one torpedo. The MADDOX changed course in an evasive move and the two torpedoes passed close aboard on the starboard side (100 to 200 yards).

USS TICONDEROGA (CVA-14) advised she was sending four already airborne F-8E's (CRUSADERS) with rockets and 20 mm. ammunition to provide air cover for MADDOX. The pilots were instructed not to fire unless MADDOX or the aircraft were fired upon.

MORE

4:21 A.M., August 2:

The third PT moved up to the beam of the MADDOX and received a direct hit by a five-inch round, and at the same time dropped a torpedo into the water which was not seen to run. Machine gun fire from the PT's was directed at the MADDOX. However, there was no damage or injury to personnel. The MADDOX continued in a southerly direction to join with the C. TURNER JOY (DD-951) as TICONDEROGA aircraft commenced attacking the PT's. ZUNI rocket runs and 20 mm strafing attacks were directed against two of the PT's and they were damaged. The third PT remained dead in the water after the direct hit by the MADDOX. At 4:29 A.M., the aircraft broke off the engagement and escorted the MADDOX towards South Viet Nam waters.

The C. TURNER JOY has joined with the MADDOX and they are continuing patrols in the area in international waters. Aircraft from the TICONDEROGA are providing protective coverage.

END

4:30 A.M., August 2:

MADDOX reported that three torpedoes were on a southerly course heading toward the ship at extreme range (over 10 miles). The MADDOX at this point was about 30 miles from the coast.

4:40 A.M., August 2:

MADDOX reported she was being approached by the PT's (estimated 4 to 5 miles) craft whose apparent intention was to conduct a surprise attack and that she intended to open fire in self-defense if necessary.

4:50 A.M., August 2:

MADDOX reported she was being attacked by the PT's. She opened fire with her five-inch battery after three warning shots failed to slow down the attackers.

4:58 A.M., August 2:

The PT's continued their closing maneuvers and two of the PT's closed to 2,000 yards, each firing one torpedo. The MADDOX changed course in an evasive move and the two torpedoes passed ahead of her on the starboard side (100 to 200 yards).

US TICONDEROGA (CV-14) advised she was sending four aircraft (F-4E's) (CHALLENGER) with rockets and 20 mm ammunition to provide air cover for MADDOX. The pilots were instructed not to fire unless MADDOX or the aircraft were

FROM

MADDOX INCIDENT

71
August 2, 1964

THE FOLLOWING WAS RELEASED BY CINCPAC at 1015 EDT today:

While on routine patrol in international waters at 020800 GCT (1608 local time), the U.S. destroyer MADDOX underwent an unprovoked attack by three PT-type boats in latitude 19-40 North; longitude 106-34 East; in the Tonkin Gulf.

The attacking boats launched three torpedoes and used 37 millimeter gunfire. The MADDOX answered with five-inch gunfire. Shortly thereafter four F-8 (Cruiser) aircraft from the USS TICONDEROGA joined in the defense of MADDOX, using ZUNI rockets and 20 millimeter strafing attacks. The PT boats were driven off, with one seen to be badly damaged and not moving and the other two damaged and retreating slowly.

No casualties or damage were sustained by MADDOX or the aircraft.

END

QUERY: Was the Maddox a FRAM conversion. Answer: No

Query: Where is the site. Answer: About 80 SE of Hanoi and 30 miles of coast of North Vietnam.

Query: NOK and addresses of O'Gier and Herrick.
wife: Leila C. O'Gier, 3108 Ocana Ave. Long Beach, Calif.
(1 daughter, 2 sons)
parents: (no first name available) 1517 Bay St. N.E. St. Petersburg Fla.
wife: Geraldine M. Herrick 12602 Lamplighter St., Garden Grove, Calif.
mother: Mrs. Lillian M. Herrick 3400 Elliot Ave., So. Minneapolis, Minn.

at Cdr. Herbert L. O'Gier, Destroyer Commander
Capt. John J. Herrick, Commander, Destroyer Division

Query: Photos available of Maddox, O'Gier, and Herrick? Yes, at Photo Branch

Query: Biogs available? Not today (Sunday). Will try tomorrow.